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I. INTRODUCTION: MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AND EMPLOYER ADVANTAGE RHETORIC
As a matter of general practice, the use of mandatory arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism for employment discrimination claims has
I. The term "mandatory arbitration" has been used synonymously with the descriptor
"pre-dispute arbitration agreements." See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of
Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1998); see also Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and
State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution
Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 398 n.2 (1998) (finding the same). In this Article, mandatory
arbitration means those instances where an employer has developed a mandatory policy
requiring that employees, as a condition of their employment, agree to use binding arbitration
as the method to resolve any future disputes that may arise. See, e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing motion to compel arbitration of
statutory age discrimination claim based on pre-dispute agreement in the securities industry).
This landmark case is referred to throughout the Article and discussed in more detail infra
Part II. This Article does not address mandatory, court-annexed, or court-administered
arbitration. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR:
A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:
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failed to give employers an overall advantage.2 Instead, this Article will
show that the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve statutory employment
discrimination disputes presents a significant number of disadvantages for
employers, especially large corporations that operate as repeat players 3 in
employment litigation.
First, despite purported cost benefits from using alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"), arbitration can be just as expensive as litigation if not
more costly.4 Second, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to clarify the
Fail Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, II OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
297 (1996). Some recent articles provide an excellent discussion of specific mandatory
arbitration court programs. See, e.g., Thomas L. Fowler, Court-Ordered Arbitration in North
Carolina: Selected Issues of Practice and Procedure, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 191 (1999)
(describing the North Carolina mandatory arbitration program); Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, A
Lawyer's Guide to Mandatory Arbitration in Illinois, 86 ILL. B.J. 550 (1998) (describing the
Illinois mandatory arbitration program); Michael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin 's New
Court-Ordered ADR Law: Why it is Needed and its Potential for Success, 78 MARQ. L. REV.
583 (1995) (describing the Wisconsin mandatory arbitration program).
2. The terms "advantage" and "benefit" are used synonymously throughout this
Article, along with their opposites "disadvantage" and "no benefit." Because these are broad
terms, this Article has limited their meaning to an analysis of the costs and outcomes from the
mandatory arbitration forum versus the judicial forum. If the costs and outcomes are better for
an employer in one forum, it is an advantage to pursue that forum over the other and a
disadvantage if the costs or outcomes are worse. The thesis of this Article is that mandatory
arbitration is a disadvantage for large employers in terms of overall costs and outcomes when
compared to the courts. While this Article takes no position on the value of different
procedures used as a whole for each forum, e.g., rules of evidence, written decisions,
discovery, etc., to the extent any procedures have been alleged to affect costs or outcomes,
they are, nevertheless, discussed in this Article.
3. Repeat players are defined as individuals or entities that have "had and anticipate[]
repeated litigation." Marc S. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98 (1974). Repeat players have low stakes
in the outcome of any case, and [have] the resources to pursue their long-run interests." Id.
4. See Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts'
Use of Antisuit Injunction Against Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 126 (1998). Stemlight
states:
Although it is often posited that binding arbitration is quicker and cheaper than
litigation, this has yet to be established by empirical evidence. Anecdotal evidence
reveals that binding arbitration can, at times, be more fraught with delay than
litigation, and also can be more costly, at least for one of the parties.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and
Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 959 & n.161 (1999)
("[E]mpirical studies have found that at least some forms of alternative dispute resolution take
as long as litigation and are as costly to the litigants... "); Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR
Really Save Money? The Jury's Still Out, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C12 (discussing
findings from a Rand study showing that it was more expensive to use court-ordered ADR
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
problems with mandatory arbitration has increased the likelihood of ongoing
litigation and uncertainty about enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements. Third, a growing judicial hostility to unfair mandatory
arbitration procedures in the lower courts has made arbitration more like
litigation, including adding certain components that increase the costs of
arbitration. Fourth, some members of Congress and certain civil rights
groups have shown a strong determination to challenge these agreements,
and their efforts have contributed to the essential abolishment of mandatory
arbitration agreements in the securities industry. Fifth, a tremendous
opposition from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has made mandatory arbitration agreements essentially worthless in
instances where the EEOC has disregarded these agreements, assisted others
in challenging their enforcement in court, and successfully obtained
injunctive relief and monetary damages from courts in their own actions
against companies to attack the use of these agreements.5 Finally, with
evidence of resounding results on behalf of employers in the litigation
process and absent evidence that arbitration will provide similar results,
employers have no real advantage and little incentive to use mandatory
arbitration.
6
Despite these disadvantages, many critics of mandatory arbitration may
find the thesis that large employers do not derive an advantage from it hard
to swallow. Without any empirical evidence of employer advantage, 7 most
than the courts and Ms. Hensler's position that the use of arbitration outside of the courts
would likely produce unanticipated outcomes regarding costs because the disputing behavior
of litigants and their attorneys is influenced by non-economic as well as economic factors).
5. For a discussion of how the EEOC's actions create tremendous problems for
employers, see infra Part Ill.
6. See infra Part Ill. Despite the clamor about mandatory arbitration, the reality is that
only a relatively small percentage of employers use mandatory arbitration. See United States
General Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination: Most Private-Sector Employers Use
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Letter Report, 07/05/95, GAO/HEHS-95-150), at 7 (visited
Feb. 28, 2000) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?/Paddress= 162.140.64.21
&filename=he95150.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao> (finding that, despite a general
increase in using ADR for employment disputes, only 9.9% of employers using these ADR
approaches employed arbitration programs, while only "about one-fourth to one-half' of
those employers used mandatory arbitration in their arbitration programs) [hereinafter GAO
Report]. This 1995 report was based on a questionnaire sent to a nationally representative
sample of businesses with more than 100 employees according to reports filed with the EEOC
in 1992. Id.
7. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to develop empirical studies of the use of ADR
without the joint support of employers, employees, and providers of ADR services, due to the
private nature and confidentiality of the disputes. See Carrie Menkei-Meadow, When Dispute
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of the scholarly debate has assumed that mandatory arbitration benefits
employers. 8 A great degree of this employer advantage rhetoric 9 has relied
on the reverse logic that employers would not be trying to use mandatory
arbitration if it did not provide an advantage for them and a disadvantage for
employees. 10 Although the relationships between employers and their
Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1871, 1924 (1997) ("In contrast to the many court-connected program evaluations,
however, there is little to no information concerning the private uses of ADR, in large part
because developing anything close to an experimental or comparative design model is
virtually impossible.") (footnotes omitted). The American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
has assisted with the collection of data for some initial empirical investigations of mandatory
arbitration. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMPL.
RTS. & EMPL. POL. J. 189 (1997) (describing empirical study of employment arbitration
results from information provided to the author by the AAA). The AAA has admitted,
however, that there is a lack of empirical data to assist corporations in deciding whether they
should choose ADR. See Julie A. Klein, Researching Results of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1999, at 3. In response, the AAA has created a global research
center to gather this information and is developing funding to support the thorough analysis
of this data. Id.
8. See, e.g., Steven M. Kaufmann & John A. Chanin, Directing the Flood: The
Arbitration of Employment Claims, 10 LAB. LAW. 217, 219 (1994) (alleging the purported
"significant benefits" of speed and lower cost for employers in employment discrimination
disputes as compared to the federal courts as stated by management-side attorneys from
Morrison & Forester in Denver, Colorado). It is a bit surprising to hear how much of an
advantage mandatory arbitration is supposed to provide employers because many
management-side attorneys have been more inclined to be concerned about the problems with
mandatory arbitration than its purported benefits. See Employers Reluctant to Embrace
Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84, at A-14 (Apr. 30,
1992) (finding from a survey of management-side attorneys and employer counsel of Fortune
500 companies that most employers disliked Gilmer because it is on "the cutting edge of a
thorny legal issue, which they expect will generate further litigation" and employers want
"the law to be more settled and the benefits to be clearer"). From this Article's review of
mandatory arbitration, the purported benefits of speed and lower cost are at worst illusory,
especially for large employers, and at best may only benefit certain small employers. See infra
Parts Ill and IV.
9. Because this Article will show that most of the presumed advantages for employers
in using mandatory arbitration, including advantages that are repeatedly stated by
commentators, have been wrongly assumed, see infra Part 111, this Article has resorted to
calling these purported advantages "employer advantage rhetoric," a term developed from an
analogous situation discussed recently by Jacqueline Nolan-Haley. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle For Truly Educated
Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 775-81 (1999) (describing a repetitive
discourse about the existence of consent in mediation and attacking that assumption as an
ongoing ADR consent rhetoric).
10. Employers, like individuals, are fallible and make decisions every day without fully
RUTGERS LA WJOURNTAL
employees, or perhaps more appropriately between corporations and
plaintiffs' counsel, might have reached an all-time high of discontent,I
absent some empirical support, this reverse logic has little justification.
Likewise, the assumption that employers have chosen arbitration because
certain advantages in arbitration will allow them to prevail at higher rates
than in the court system has yet to be proven by empirical evidence. 12 The
understanding or appreciating the effects of those decisions. As discussed in Part III of this
Article, a general "disconnect" between corporate leaders and their counsel has led to some of
the decision-making regarding the employment of mandatory arbitration for the sole purpose
of cutting legal fees without any appreciation of the overall costs or whether arbitration is an
advantageous forum. Because of this focus on legal fees, evidence that corporations are using
arbitration for a large number of its disputes, including many disputes where they are not able
to create the system, suggests that it is not intended as a mechanism for the pure disadvantage
of employees. See Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 32 (1998) (noting how corporations are choosing
arbitration in a variety of disputes where they cannot control the process because they are
seeking to cut legal expenses).
I 1. See Mark Ballard, Lawyer Label Hurts at Polls, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 1999, at AI
(describing how the public hate for plaintiffs' trial attorneys has become so pervasive that
individuals seeking legislative positions are losing when their opponents identify their
background as trial attorneys because the anti-trial lawyer theme resonates with the public
that has been sharpened to these concerns by insurance companies and businesses).
12. Nevertheless, there were some reports after Gilmer about employer advantage while
using arbitration in the securities industry when those disputes were handled by their
arbitration panels. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of
Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. L. 21, 65-66 nn.284-87 (1997) (describing unofficial survey
of law firm representing a large number of securities industry employers and finding that
employers successfully defeated claimants in 57 out of 63 (90.4%) discrimination issues
raised in cases with NASD and 33 out of 54 (61.1%) discrimination issues raised in cases
with NYSE in published arbitration awards from 1991 to 1997). Admittedly, this survey was
small and unofficial, and it gave no reason to explain the validity of those results or whether
they would transfer to outside of the securities industry. Id. at 66. The somewhat incestuous
relationship between.the securities industry and the arbitration pools used in the arbitration
process probably played a significant role in such results. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 207, 210 & n.25 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding
inherent bias in employment arbitration in the securities industry because employers were
controlling the arbitrator appointment process by governing the stock exchanges as
exemplified by the fact that the Chairman of the Merrill Lynch was also on the Board of the
NYSE and the NYSE Chairman of the Board was responsible for recommending and
appointing the arbitrator pools and the only person listed in NASD's arbitration pool with any
employment experience in 1995 was a Merrill Lynch officer), ajfd on other grounds, 170
F.3d I (Ist Cir. 1999). Even with these purported outcome advantages, other costs have led
the securities industry to virtually abandon the use of mandatory arbitration. See infra Part
III.A.3.
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other unproven assumption of the employer advantage rhetoric asserts that
employers save time and money by using mandatory arbitration. 
13
Surprisingly, few commentators have challenged these assumptions.
14
With little empirical evidence that mandatory arbitration does, in fact,
benefit employers or for that matter provide a disadvantage to employees,
many commentators still emphatically believe that mandatory arbitration
should be banned. They have made persuasive arguments in support of their
positions. 15 What little empirical evidence that does exist shows that the
costs of using arbitration are unpredictable because economic and non-
economic factors dictate the actions of parties. 16 Given the number of
disadvantages in costs and outcomes, employers now have no incentive to
use mandatory arbitration.
Very little work has been done to foster the use of arbitration after a
dispute arises instead of mandatory arbitration. Because the limited
empirical data shows that employees are much more successful in
arbitration, employees have an incentive to use arbitration after a dispute
arises. With limited finances, small employers may still prefer arbitration
after a dispute arises. Large employers must still be provided with an
incentive to choose arbitration. If offering arbitration after the dispute arises
13. Stemlight, supra note 4, at 126.
14. There are a few instances where these assumptions were challenged when court-
annexed arbitration programs were involved. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2211, 2253
(arguing that court-annexed arbitration may even prompt an increase in costs to the extent it
becomes another layer of procedure added onto the existing adjudication system); Frank E.A.
Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 885, 886 (1996)
(describing Rand study and results showing no savings in costs or time by using court-
annexed arbitration); see also Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DiSp. RESOL. 1, 46
(finding that ADR creates a "new layer of administrative expense for courts and another layer
of transaction costs for litigants"). Without explaining his point, Professor Stempel appears to
agree that the assumption of ADR savings is not well-founded even in ADR programs that are
not court-annexed. See Stempel, supra note I, at 329 ("Not surprisingly, subsequent studies
of arbitration in practice, even those generally favorable to arbitration, have found that it is
not appreciately faster or cheaper than litigation of similar matters."). With respect to the only
clear and discernible benefit of arbitration for employers, a quicker decision, Professor
Stempel has also noted that this may not necessarily be an advantage because it may result in
an improper rush to judgment causing "inaccuracy, unfairness, or frayed relations between the
disputants or between the disputants and the tribunal." Id. at 330.
15. See sources cited infra note 25.
16. See Hensler, supra note 4, at C12 (discussing comments of Debra Hensler, Rand
corporation researcher, describing empirical results from court ADR programs showing no
cost savings and her opinion that cost savings in outside arbitration programs will be very
unpredictable).
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could limit punitive damages, it would create an incentive for both large and
small employers to use arbitration without the problems created by
mandatory arbitration.
The goal of this Article is to promote critical thinking about the practical
problems that employers face when using mandatory arbitration. By
realizing that mandatory arbitration presents no panacea for employers, the
inherent value of using arbitration as a fair supplement and not a
replacement to the court may start to be analyzed, and a limit to the
scholarly focus on mandatory arbitration can hopefully result. The absence
of any true advantage for employers as a whole suggests that the massive
criticism and tremendous focus on mandatory arbitration over the past
decade may have resulted in a huge waste of time, except for those
employers in the securities industry that were directly affected by Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.17 Those efforts could have been focusing on
the use of non-binding mechanisms, such as post-dispute arbitration or even
mediation-which is becoming the more preferred option for resolving
employment discrimination disputes.
18
Part II of this Article identifies the tortuous evolution of mandatory
arbitration by explaining the growing support for using arbitration to resolve
statutory disputes and its intersection with development of the broad
remedies in the judicial forum provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the
"Act") 19 for employment discrimination claims. This provides the
framework for understanding the disadvantages for large employers in using
mandatory arbitration instead of litigation to resolve these disputes. Part III
addresses the central inquiry of this Article--does mandatory arbitration
give large employers an advantage? After providing a negative answer to
that question for large employersin Part III, Part IV addresses the unique and
somewhat complex issues for smaller employers with respect to purported
benefits from mandatory arbitration. Part V describes a short proposal to
correct these problems by providing an incentive for large and small
employers to use arbitration after a dispute arises rather than mandatory
arbitration. Finally, Part VI presents a final assessment of where the critical
17. See Bompey et al., supra note 12, at 65-66 (describing the effect of Gilmer on the
securities industry from 1991 to 1997 by an unofficial survey).
18. See Lisa Brennan, What Lawyers Like: Mediation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A l
(describing a 1999 survey of attorneys conducted by the American Arbitration Association
and the National Law Journal finding an overwhelming preference in 69% of litigators and
88% of in-house counsel for using mediation instead of arbitration, which was preferred by
only 25% of the litigators and only 9% of in-house counsel).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1994).
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focus of ADR may shift now that the myth about employer advantage from
mandatory arbitration has been exposed.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND ITS
PROBLEMATIC INTERSECTION WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991:
FROM GARDNER-DENVER TO GILMER AND THE WRIGHT FALLOUT
Due to the meteoric rise of the ADR movement, 20 increasing distrust of
the legal system by corporate leaders, 21 and the Supreme Court's 1991
endorsement of arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination
disputes in Gilmer,22 a growing number of employers have started to use
mandatory arbitration agreements.23 As a result, a prolific amount of
scholarly criticism about Gilmer24 and about employers' use of mandatory
arbitration has transpired over the last decade.
25
20. See generally David P. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The
Corporate Embrace of ADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133 (1998) (discussing survey and
interviews with 606 Fortune 1000 corporate counsel respondents about the general increase in
the use of mandatory arbitration and reasons for its growth).
21. See John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and
Executives' Opinion, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1 (1998) (describing results of survey
started in 1994 of 178 respondents, including 70 outside counsel, 58 inside counsel, and 50
executives showing a decreasing belief in the benefits of litigation versus ADR especially
among corporate executives); see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure
in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986) (analyzing the general loss of faith in litigation and
suggesting reasons why faith in litigation should be renewed).
22. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
23. See Stephanie Armour, Mandatory Arbitration: A Pill Many are Forced to Swallow,
U.S.A. TODAY, July 9, 1998, at IA (showing a growing number of employers, including
Circuit City, Travelers Group, Hooters of America, The Olive Garden, and Red Lobster, are
using mandatory arbitration); John Leming, Companies Seek to Reduce Employee Suits, J.
COM., Feb. 9, 1999, at 5A (discussing efforts of insurance companies to encourage employers
to adopt mandatory arbitration policies); see also Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:
Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REV. 847 (1996) (describing the growing
use of ADR by businesses).
24. Professor Robert Covington recently stated, "The [Gilmer] opinion has been the
subject of commentary in well over a hundred law review articles, and has been chewed over
in countless academic conferences, after-dinner speeches, and briefings for managers." Robert
N. Covington, Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United
States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 345, 351-52 (1998); see also Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
577, 603 n. 116 (1997) ("The [Gilmer] case has prompted a flood of scholarly literature and
criticism.").
25. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, On
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
Before 1991, most parties believed that courts would not enforce
agreements requiring mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims. 26 Since 1991, employers have increasingly and
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Paul D. Carrington &
Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (1997); Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Christine
Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims, I I ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1992); David E. Feller, Fender
Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory Protection of Individual Employee
Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561
(1997); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. I
(1996); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or
Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Pierre Levy,
Gilmer Revisited: The Judicial Erosion of Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. REV. 455
(1996); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Jennifer N. Manuszak, Pre-Dispute Civil Rights Arbitration in
the Nonunion Sector: The Need for a Tandem Reform Effort at the Contracting, Procedural
and Judicial Review Stages, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 387 (1997); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea Or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims With Special Reference to the Three A 's-Access, Adjudication, and
Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996); Christine K. Biretta, Comment, Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Lai: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Arbitration?, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 595 (1997); Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not To Be?:
Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64
UMKC L. REv. 547 (1996); Catherine B. Hagen & Kathleen B. Hayward, The Issues
Concerning Mandatory Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 23; see also
Symposium: New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities
Industry: Employment Discrimination, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1613, 1626-27 (1995) (noting
statements of plaintiffs' counsel, Judith Vladeck, about problems with mandatory arbitration).
About seven years ago, I was also one of the commentators who had criticized the Supreme
Court's enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses. See Michael Z. Green, Preempting
Justice through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap
for the Unwary Consumer, 5 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 112 (1993).
26. See, e.g., R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1541-42 & n.4 (1994) (finding that, before
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successfully used mandatory arbitration. That increase can be attributed to
the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration to resolve statutory
employment discrimination disputes in Gilmer and the right to extended
legal remedies and a jury trial made possible by the Act.
27
A bitter debate about the use of mandatory arbitration has developed
since Gilmer. The strong feelings about Gilmer have stemmed from the
concern that employers, the group whose actions the employment
discrimination laws attempt to regulate, may circumvent certain statutory
rights, remedies, and procedures afforded to claimants under the Act by
requiring that employees agree to arbitrate their future disputes as a
condition of employment. 28 In an apparently endless attack, many
commentators have argued that fundamentally important rights to jury trials
and legal damages (that were only obtained in 1991 after two years of
contentious debate in Congress and factious negotiations) 29 are being
subsumed by mandatory agreements to arbitrate these claims when
employers force employees to sign them as a condition of obtaining
Gilmer, arbitration and litigation of statutory discrimination claims were considered
supplementary and not mutually exclusive); see also Ralph H. Baxter, Jr., & Evelyn M. Hunt,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitration of Employment Claims, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
187 (1989) ("With the possible exception of employment discrimination claims, employers
can establish mandatory written arbitration procedures as the sole method for resolving
disputes with their employees."). Baxter and Hunt made this statement because of the
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), which
proscribed arbitration of Title VII employment discrimination claims from being the sole
method of resolving those disputes. Id. at 195-96.
27. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DiSP. RESOL.
J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 10 (stating that "a growing number of lower federal courts have been called
upon to review employment-related [mandatory] arbitration agreements with respect to a
broad range of statutory employment claims" because of the Gilner decision, monetary
remedies, and jury trial rights provided by the Act).
28. Joseph R. Grodin, On the Interface Between Labor and Employment Law, 19
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310-11 (1998).
29. Several commentators have addressed the acrimonious process leading to the
passage of the Act in 1991. See generally Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921 (1993); Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Reginald C.
Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the
Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1993);
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have
to? Do You Really Want to?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255 (1994); Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: What Does it Mean and What is its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304
(19.92); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (1993).
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employment. 3 0 The plaintiffs' bar, government agencies, academics, and
ADR providers have all sought to ban mandatory arbitration. 31 Their actions
and a lack of clarification by the Supreme Court since Gilmer have forced
employers to explore the depths of any underlying tension or conflict
between the growing use of mandatory arbitration and the significant
accomplishments of the Act.
A. Development ofMandatory Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act
In 1991, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")32 and its preference for
resolving disputes by arbitration collided with the hard-fought availability of
jury trials and damage awards for intentional employment discrimination
claims under the Act.3 3 In a decision interpreting the scope of the FAA on
30. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 420-39 (1999) (criticizing the increasing
use of arbitration as a legitimate forum to resolve employment discrimination disputes and
arguing that mandatory arbitration agreements should not be enforced because the strong
public policy in eradicating discrimination in the workplace dictates a public forum to handle
these disputes). A number of other recent articles exemplify the ongoing criticism of the
Gilner decision, its impact, or both. See, e.g., Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Encouraged or Proscribed?, 44
WAYNE L. REV. 1619 (1999); Covington, supra note 24; Andrea Fitz, The Debate Over
Mandatory Arbitration in Employment Disputes, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 35; Leona
Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy Issue in
Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 173 (1998); Paul
H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039 (1998); Victoria J. Craine, Note, The Mandatory
Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection or Employee Coercion, 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 537
(1999); David M. Kinnecome, Note, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral
Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment
Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745 (1999); 'Amy L. Ray, Comment, When Employers
Litigate to Arbitrate: New Standards of Enforcement for Employer Mandated Arbitration
Agreements, 51 SMU L. REV. 441 (1998); Monica J. Washington, Note, Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial
Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844 (1999).
31. See infra Part III.
32. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
33. See Feller, supra note 25, at 568 (describing the intersection of disputes covered by
the FAA and the Act as resulting in either a fender bender or train wreck "collision"); see also
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Act's new
provision for jury trials and legal damages in Title VII cases was a "strong expression of
federal policy that should be enforced" and that "by being forced into binding arbitration
[employees] would be surrendering their right to trial by jury-a right that civil rights
plaintiffs (or their lawyers) fought hard for and finally obtained in the 1991 amendments to
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May 13, 1991, the Supreme Court in Gilmer34 held that an employee who
had signed an agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes could be
compelled to take a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") 35 to arbitration rather than pursuing the claim in court. 36
An interesting issue that the Court in Gilmer refused to decide and that
still remains unanswered today is whether the FAA applies to employment
agreements. Section 1 of the FAA, 37 known as the Employment Contract
Exclusion, states, in pertinent part: "Nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in interstate commerce."'38 In Gilmer, the arbitration
agreement was contained in the securities registration application, a contract
between Gilmer and the securities exchange, not an agreement between
Gilmer and his employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane. Although the Supreme
Court held the ADEA claim to be arbitrable, in footnote two of its decision,
the Court left "for another day" the issue of the contracts of employment
exemption in section 1 and whether an arbitration agreement in an
employment contract is enforceable under the FAA. 39 Nevertheless, the
Title VI I").
34. 500U.S.20(1991).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
36. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20. In 1981, when Gilmer became a manager of financial
services for his employer, he was required as a condition of his employment to execute a
registration application with the New York Stock Exchange that provided for arbitration of
any controversy between him and his employer. Id. at 23. When he was terminated several
years later, Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim in federal court under the ADEA against
his employer. Id. at 23-24. The employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the registration agreement. Id. at 24.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
38. Id.
39. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Despite the Court's failure to address the contracts of
employment exemption in Gilmer, several lower courts have limited the scope of the
exemption to employees directly engaged in the movement of interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Tenet
Health Care, 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d
222 (3d Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v.
TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates,
71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Jennifer A. Marler, Note, Arbitrating Employment
Discrimination Claims: The Lower Courts Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. to
Inchlde Individual Employment Contracts, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 443 (1996) (describing
expansion of Gilmer by lower courts). Only one court has found that the FAA does not apply
to labor or employment agreements. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding that other courts allowing these agreements have ignored the requirement that,
for the FAA to apply, the contract must evidence a "transaction" involving interstate
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Gilmer case made it clear that mandatory arbitration of federal employment
discrimination claims was not automatically precluded as a matter of law
and that the Court was now willing to endorse its use.
The Gilmer decision appeared to conflict with the Court's prior decision
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver.40 In Gardner-Denver, the plaintiff had
filed a Title VII lawsuit alleging employment discrimination on the basis of
race despite having lost his claim of unjust discharge based on race in labor
arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement
between the plaintiff's union and his employer. The Court in Gardner-
Denver found that the rights of an individual to pursue statutory
employment discrimination claims were separate and apart from the
contractual claims handled by his union in the grievance and labor
arbitration process.4 1 Consequently, Gardner-Denver established that
employees may pursue employment discrimination claims in arbitration
without being precluded from pursuing vindication of their statutory claims
in court.
Only seventeen years later, the Court in Gilmer signaled for the first
time that it would approve the use of the arbitral forum to resolve statutory
employment discrimination disputes. Since the Gilmer decision, most lower
courts have expanded the scope of Gilmer to apply to virtually all statutory
employment discrimination disputes.42 The Gilmer decision did, however,
commerce). See generally Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers Contracts" under the United States
Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282
(1996) (asserting that exemption for employment contracts by section 1 of the FAA should
have broad coverage); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract
Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of
Statutory Vision, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 259 (asserting same).
40. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
41. Id. at 50 ("The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is
not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And
certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their
respectively appropriate forums.").
42. See. e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998) (ADA); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. All Agent Actions, 133 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
1998) (RICO); Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997)
(ADA); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997) (FMLA); Patterson v.
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title VII); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v.
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997) (Title VII); Cole v. Bums Int'l. Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d
1465 (DC Cir. 1997) (Title VII); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir.
1995) (ADEA); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir.
1993) (ERISA); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992) (Title
VII); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1992) (Employee
[Vol. 31:399
2000] MANDA TORYARBITRA TION FOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 413
leave open the possibility that an agreement to compel arbitration of
statutory claims will not be enforceable when a statute's language or
legislative history indicates an express intent to preclude compulsory
arbitration or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's
purpose.
43
B. Encouragement ofArbitration By The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Only six months after the Gilmer decision, President Bush signed the
Act, which created several amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 44 the preeminent federal law proscribing discrimination in
employment on the basis of certain protected classes, including race, sex,
color, and national origin.45 Prior to the Act, Title VII claimants were
limited to seeking backpay and equitable relief through a bench trial.
Accordingly, a key provision of the Act established that Title VII plaintiffs
with intentional discrimination claims could also seek compensatory and
punitive damages and have their claims settled through a jury trial.46
Section 118 of the Act also encouraged the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, including arbitration, "[w]here appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law," to resolve employment discrimination disputes.47
Consequently, many employers have contended that section 118 allows or
even encourages compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. Employers have
also argued that, by the time the Act was passed, compulsory arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination claims was "authorized by law"-that
Polygraph Protection Act); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992) (Title VII); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title
VII); Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 947 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1991) (RICO); Alford v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Williams v. Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. III. 1993) (§ 1981).
43. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). The Court in Gilner found that neither the ADEA's
language nor its legislative history demonstrated a conflict with or an intent to preclude
compulsory arbitration. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-1 7 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
45. See William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for
Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in
Employment: A Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 29, 45
(1998) (noting that Title VII is the "most commonly invoked" statute in addressing claims of
unwarranted discriminatory practices in hiring and employment).
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b), (c) (1994).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (statutory note).
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is, by Gilmer; therefore, compulsory arbitration is one of the means of
dispute resolution that section 118, and the Act, encourages.
4 8
In response to employer arguments that section 118 encourages
mandatory arbitration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided that the jury trial and damage components of the Act should
not be eluded through pre-dispute arbitration clauses. In Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co.,49 the Ninth Circuit held that an employer may
not require, as a condition of employment, that an employee waive the right
to bring Title VII claims in court and agree, in advance, to submit all future
employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. 50 Instead, the Ninth
Circuit found that Congress had demonstrated conclusively its intent to
preclude the mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims. 5 1 According to the
Ninth Circuit, a review of the Act's purposes and the text of its legislative
history reveals that Congress valued the importance of its newly-created
rights to a jury trial and legal damages. From that review, the Duffield court
found that Congress expected that its encouragement of arbitration in section
118 of the Act would not mean that employers could use mandatory
arbitration to eliminate an employee's access to these new rights for victims
of intentional discrimination. 52 Specifically, the Duffield court interpreted
"where appropriate" in section 118 of the Act to mean where arbitration
furthers the Act's purpose and objective by providing employees an
opportunity to present discrimination claims in an alternative forum. It was
not appropriate to force employees into a forum where they did not want to
be.53
The Duffield court also read the terms "to the extent authorized by law"
as referring to the law as it existed when section 118 was drafted.54 That
section was drafted prior to the Gilmer decision and at a time when
Gardner-Denver provided the clear rule that arbitration of Title VII claims
could not be compelled. Because of this timing, the Duffield court found
that, although Gilmer may have undermined the scope of Gardner-Denver, it
did not alter Congress' intent in drafting section 118, i.e., any arbitration
48. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996)
(where employer successfully made this argument).
49. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
50. Id. at 1190.
51. Id. at 1193.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1194.
54. Id. at 1195-96.
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agreement would operate to the extent authorized by Gardner-Denver.55
According to the Duffield court, Congress understood that section 118 was
drafted with the intent that compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims was
not "authorized by law" and that compelling employees to give up their right
to litigate future Title VII claims as a condition of employment was not
"appropriate." 56
Similarly, in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,57 the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found that Congress intended to preclude the enforcement of mandatory,
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in Title VII cases. Likewise, Judge
Gettleman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois agreed with these decisions and explained their reasoning in Winkler
v. Pacific Brokerage Services, Inc. 58 as follows:
This court finds these particularly thorough and well-reasoned opinions
[Duffield and Rosenberg] persuasive. As both the Duffield and Rosenberg
courts recognized, Congress rejected an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 under which "employers could refuse to hire workers unless they
signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints."
The amendment was rejected because Congress believed that "American
workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil
rights." In the instant case, plaintiff appears to have faced such a choice.
Accordingly, this court finds that any agreement by plaintiff to submit future
Title VII claims to arbitration, made either in the employment application or
in the arbitration agreement, is unenforceable.
59
55. Id. at 1196.
56. Id. at 198.
57. 995 F. Supp. 190, 203-04 (D. Mass. 1998), affidon other grounds, 170 F.3d I (Ist
Cir. 1999).
58. No. 97 C 7340, 1998 WL 341622 (N.D. III. June 19, 1998).
59. Winkler, 1998 WL 341622, at *2 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40(l) (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549). Since Judge Gettleman's decision in Winder, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over the Winkler court, has rejected the reasoning of
Duffield and Rosenberg and stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not intended to
prevent the enforcement of mandatory arbitration and that the legislative history does not
indicate a desire to prevent those claims from being resolved by arbitration rather than the
courts. See Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); see also
Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1999) (following Koveleskie in
finding that mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable, that there was sufficient
consideration under state law to support enforcement of the arbitration agreement, and that
the plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim under Title VII had to be resolved in
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Many commentators had hoped that the Duffield case would set the
stage for the Supreme Court to finally explain how mandatory arbitration as
a condition of employment could be enforceable in light of the strong public
policy of allowing jury trials and compensatory and punitive damage awards
under the Act. However, in November 1998, the Supreme Court refused to
hear the petition for review of Duffield. Then only a week after its refusal to
hear the review of Duffield, the Court issued its opinion in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.60 In Wright, the Court addressed the issue
of whether an agreement for mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment would be enforceable in a union setting. The Court stated that,
in order for a union to waive an individual employee's right to pursue a
discrimination claim in a judicial forum, clear and unmistakable
relinquishment of the right to pursue the statutory claim in question must
exist. 61 Because the collective bargaining agreement in Wright failed to
specify that it covered disputes involving the statutory claim at issue, the
Court found that it was not a clear and unmistakable waiver, and the
employee was not compelled to resolve the matter in arbitration. 6
2
By limiting its decision to the actual language in the collective
bargaining agreement, the Wright Court skirted the question of whether the
arbitration). In addition to the express rejection of Duffield by the Seventh Circuit in
Koveleskie, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the legislative
history of the Act in Duffield. See Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
But see Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REv.
445, 464-77 (1999) (criticizing the analysis in Seus).
60. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). A full review of Wright's implications is beyond the scope of
this Article, but other commentators have explored that subject. See, e.g., T. Christopher
Baile, Comment, Reconciling Alexander and Gilmer: Explaining the Continued Validity of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. in the Context of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 219 (1999); Michael B. Kass, Note, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp., 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 945 (1999); Daniel Roy, Note, Mandatory Arbitration
of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace after Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347 (1999); Jacob E. Tyler, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims Under Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Effect of Wright, 4
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 253 (1999). Also, Professor David E. Feller, who prepared an
amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Wright on behalf of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, wrote an article predicting the results of Wright that was published shortly after
the Wright decision. See David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination
Claims Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 53 (1998); see also David G. Savage, Arbitration Clause NLred,
Longshoreman Can Sue Employer, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 40 (describing reactions to the
Wright decision).
61. Wright, 525 U.S. at 75.
62. Id. at 82.
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Gilmer decision applied to the union setting. Other than clarifying the clear
and unmistakable waiver requirement before compelling arbitration of a
union employee's statutory employment discrimination claim, the Wright
decision failed to answer the pressing ADR issue of this past decade for
employment discrimination claims-whether Gilmer overruled Gardner-
Denver, thus superseding all subsequent decisions finding that compulsory
arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement was not enforceable against
individual employees.
63
The Wright case created an interesting anomaly with respect to the
Court's enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses involving non-union
versus union employees. 64 Non-union employees who lack bargaining
power and a representative may find that their pre-dispute agreements to
63. Before the Supreme Court decision in Wright, virtually every other circuit found
that Gilmer did not apply to collective bargaining agreements, and Gardner-Denver
controlled those disputes so that a union employee still had a right to seek relief in a judicial
forum without being compelled to arbitrate. See, e.g., Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d
408 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11 th Cir.
1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor
Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit was an exceptional court. It
produced Wright, which adhered to its earlier decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
64. There are legitimate reasons for being concerned about protecting individual
employees when their unions enter into sweetheart deals with their employers or other
employees at the expense of certain employees, especially if made on the basis of race, sex, or
one of the other protected classes under Title VII. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating
Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 1 (1999) (describing the inherent conflicts for unions in sexual harassment disputes
between employees that it represents and the complexity of handling competing grievances if
brought by the alleged harasser and the alleged victim). The courts have attempted to address
the concern about union conflicts and improper deals that disadvantage certain employees
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). For
example, courts have required that a union owes a duty of fair representation to its members
and it may be sued by members for breach of that duty. See James E. Jones, Jr., The
Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30
RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 24-28 (1976) (discussing the duty of fair representation in relationship to
Title VII race discrimination claims). However, any challenge to these breaches is limited by
the requirement of showing that a union's actions were arbitrary and capricious. See Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (explaining arbitrary and capricious requirement and how the
judicially-created duty developed in response to a series of cases involving alleged
discrimination by unions against individual members on the basis of their race, as exemplified
by the court's decision in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)); see
also Pryner, 109 F.3d at 361-63 (describing the ineffectiveness of the duty of fair
representation when an individual employee wants to seek court action for a discrimination
claim against the will of the employee's union).
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arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims are enforceable
because adhesion agreements are not presumed unenforceable under general
contract law principles. 65 By contrast, unionized employees, who are
usually represented by an organization with tremendous bargaining power,
may find their union's agreement to arbitrate their statutory discrimination
claims is presumed unenforceable absent a "clear and unmistakable" waiver
of their individual statutory rights to pursue the matter in court. Thus, the
Wright decision shows that a lack of bargaining power continues to be an
issue that the Court has given short shrift to in its analysis.
A fair reading of Gilmer, Duffield, and Wright demonstrates that the use
of mandatory arbitration raises legitimate questions about the continued
value of the legal damage and jury trial rights that were created by the Act.
The Supreme Court appears determined to continue to avoid the clarification
of these matters as evidenced by its refusal to accept review of Duffield or
answer whether Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver in Wright. Absent action
by Congress, these issues will likely remain unresolved and present thorny
legal problems for employers.
66
III. WHY MANDATORY ARBITRATION CREATES SIGNIFICANT
DISADVANTAGES FOR LARGE EMPLOYERS
Despite the abundance of scholarly criticism about mandatory
arbitration, even a few prior detractors have now suggested that, regardless
of the concerns of being coerced into the arbitral forum, the overall benefits
of having disputes resolved in arbitration outweigh the drawbacks.
67
65. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (noting that "mere inequality" in bargaining
power does not make an adhesion agreement to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination
claims per se unenforceable); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594
(1991) (finding a consumer's adhesion agreement involving a forum selection clause was not
per se unenforceable).
66. See Michael Delikat & Renee Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims Under Pre-dispute Agreements: Will Gilmer Survive?, 16 HOFSTRA
LAB. L & EMP. L.J. 83, 131 (1998) (acknowledging a growing trend in the challenge of
mandatory arbitration agreements "in courts, by administrative agencies and in the
legislature" and assuming that a "flood" of challenge cases to mandatory arbitration
agreements would continue absent clarification by Congress or the Supreme Court).
67. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998)
(arguing that many individual employees may find mandatory arbitration a cheaper, simpler,
and overall worthwhile process to resolve their employment disputes because most employees
do not have the money, time, or resources available to them to pursue traditional avenues for
relief) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration]; Samuel Estreicher, Predispute
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Professors St. Antoine, Estreicher, and Fitzgibbon have undertaken the yoke
of standing against the multitude of scholarly criticism and perceptions
about the advantages for employers and disadvantages for employees due to
mandatory arbitration. Their arguments consistently suggest, however, that,
despite the concerns of being coerced into arbitration, employees may still
derive some actual benefit. 6 8 Additionally, another recent commentary has
made strong claims about the benefits of mandatory arbitration. It argues
that, as long as certain procedural guarantees are provided to the claimants,
employees will obtain far better opportunities to have their claims heard
through a mandatory arbitration process rather than being subjected to the
tremendous limitations inherent in the judicial process.
6 9
Likewise, Professor St. Antoine posited, "Without more empirical
evidence about the actual experience of discrimination victims, we could be
mistaken in condemning mandatory arbitration out of hand. It may well be
the most realistic hope of the ordinary claimant."' 70 Professor St. Antoine
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997)
(suggesting that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration is more efficient if it provides certain
procedural safeguards and provides equal concerns for both employers and employees); Susan
A. Fitzgibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, I EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYEE POL'Y J. 221
(1997) (asserting that mandatory arbitration provides employees with access to a dispute
resolution process that they usually would not have the opportunity to use) [hereinafter
Fitzgibbon, Reflections]. It is interesting to note that Professors St. Antoine, Estreicher, and
Fitzgibbon had previously stated concerns about coercing employees into having their
disputes resolved by arbitration. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment
Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 782-83, 797 (1990) (arguing that
mandatory arbitration will "compromise the integrity of the public law scheme" and is
"highly problematic" for adjudicating claims governed by external law); Susan A. Fitzgibbon,
The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 485, 489 (1990) ("The author asserts that freedom to
choose a forum is, in itself, a right that should be vindicated."); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Thirty Years After The Steelworkers Trilogy: Afterword, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 845, 856
(1990) (asserting concerns about "coercion, surprise, or other overreaching by a more
powerful employer" but noting that his view that consenting adults should be allowed to
arbitrate may conflict with his prior objection to the NLRB's deferral of individual
discrimination charges to arbitration).
68. In taking up these arguments, Professors Estreicher, Fitzgibbon, and St. Antoine
have exposed an "employee disadvantage rhetoric" with respect to mandatory arbitration.
69. See generally David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out The Bath Water, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999). These authors strongly
believe that, whatever disadvantages there may be to using arbitration, even as a mandatory
arbitration participant, it is worth it. Further, these authors take every opportunity to try to
establish that any alleged disadvantages (employee disadvantage rhetoric) are minimal.
70. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 9.
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supported this statement and his claim that mandatory arbitration should be
applauded, not denigrated, by pointing to the overworked and underfunded
EEOC 71 and his belief in the likelihood that plaintiffs will not find attorneys
to represent them.72 Professor St. Antoine may now believe that mandatory
arbitration could be good for employees, absent empirical evidence to the
contrary. Likewise, mandatory arbitration may be bad for employers, absent
some empirical evidence to the contrary. 73 Professor St. Antoine identified a
number of concerns with the legal system that not only represent
disadvantages to employees, but also represent advantages to employers,
including the likelihood that plaintiffs will not find counsel. 74 By agreeing
to arbitrate before a dispute arises, an employer relinquishes these
advantages without knowledge of the actual nature of the dispute or the
individuals involved.
Large employers have no incentive to seek mandatory arbitration in
most cases because of the disadvantages highlighted herein. If those cases
are handled by their capable counsel, who are repeat players in the court
system, they will almost certainly end favorably for the employer. As a
71. Several commentators have developed excellent critiques of the EEOC and
discussed whether it can adequately address the concerns of discrimination in the workplace.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997) (criticizing the EEOC's systematic role in displacing or denying the
pursuit of conflicts from the court system and thereby hindering enforcement); Maurice E.R.
Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 219
(1995) (stating that "race discrimination in employment remains pervasive despite three
decades of government effort" and asserting that the EEOC has been "constrained to focus on
processing individual charges of discrimination" rather than being able to "concentrate on
combatting broader unlawful practices"); Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC:
Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1996) (reviewing the overall ineffectiveness of the EEOC and suggesting that it should be
disbanded or its duties and functions should be significantly altered); Lamont E. Stallworth &
Linda K. Stroh, Who is Seeking to Use ADR? Why Do They Choose to Do So?, Disp. RESOL.
J., Jan./Mar. 1996, at 31 (noting the tremendous hardships placed on claimants by the
EEOC's backlog); Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 219 (1994) (arguing that Title Vii has failed to meet its goals and aspirations due to
its limited enforcement mechanisms).
72. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 2, 7-8.
73. This is the first step in attacking what this Article has referred to as the "employer
advantage rhetoric" with respect to mandatory arbitration.
74. See St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 7-8 (observing that
plaintiffs' attorneys take very few discrimination cases); see also Lewis Maltby, Paradise
Lost--How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to
Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 1, 2-3 (1994) (noting that most cases do
not have potential recovery large enough for plaintiffs' attorneys to take the risk).
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result of the employer advantage rhetoric, the disadvantages for employers
in adopting mandatory arbitration programs have not been highlighted or
thoroughly explored. 75 Those overall key disadvantages include growing
legal costs and other uncertainties, coupled with the failure to appreciate the
overwhelming success of employers in the litigation process.
A. Growing Legal Costs and Other Uncertainties
1. No Apparent Cost Savings
As discussed in the introduction of this Article, no studies have been
performed to show whether arbitration or litigation is more cost effective for
employers. 76 A number of surveys throughout the 1990s demonstrated that
some employers have used Gilmer as an incentive to invest their litigation
reserves in handling a growing percentage of employment disputes in the
arbitral forum rather than the judicial forum. 77 One recent survey, which
was conducted in Spring 1997, received responses from 606 corporate
lawyers from the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations. They reported that their
corporations had used arbitration in 62% of their employment disputes. 78
75. But see Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
Requirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1028-31 (1996); John-Paul
Motley, Note, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Employment Contracts from Gardner-
Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and Why Employers Should Choose Not to Use
Preemployment Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 687 (1998). Both Motley and
Lewton merely speculated that employers may not benefit without offering any reasons to
support their speculation. In opposition to Motley's and Lewton's inferences and also without
any reasons supporting their claims, other commentators have argued that employers do
benefit from mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone,
A Management Perspective: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements are an Effective Alternative
to Employment Litigation, DIsp. RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 19.
76. See Hensler, supra note 4, at C12; Stemlight, supra note 4, at 126; Stone, supra
note 4, at 959 & n.6 1.
77. See, e.g., E. Patrick McDermott, Survey of 92 Key Companies: Using ADR to Settle
Employment Disputes, DisP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 8, 12 (discussing results from 92 out of
336 Fortune 500 employers surveyed regarding their use of ADR in employment disputes in
late 1993 and also finding that 78% of the respondents were willing to allow an outside
arbitrator to make final decisions regarding employment disputes). These findings should be
viewed with skepticism regarding mandatory arbitration because the questionnaire only asked
the employers about their interest in having an arbitrator decide the dispute. Also, the findings
did not distinguish whether that decision would occur before or after the dispute arose or as a
condition of employment. Id.
78. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR:
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Unfortunately, "[v]ery few corporations have undertaken the rigorous
internal studies that are necessary to see if and how ADR pays off."'79 In an
interview with "Marc Galanter, a law professor at the University of
Wisconsin Law School and an authority on the court system," Professor
Galanter noted that no "independent study [has] been able to verify the
claims... that [ADR] is usually faster, cheaper and more satisfying for the
parties than traditional litigation, or that ADR has materially shrunk state or
federal court dockets."
80
There is no doubt that employers have embraced the use of ADR to
resolve their disputes. Especially after the dispute arises, ADR can provide
"more 'satisfactory settlements' than litigation" by "preserving good
relationships. '8 1 However, the failure of employers to assess the costs in
light of the increasing political, agency, and enforcement costs for
mandatory arbitration remains a puzzling predicament at this stage.
The little data (either anecdotal or empirical) that does exist supports the
position that arbitration may not be as big a savings in cost or time as
proponents claim. Employers now have their own horror stories describing
instances where arbitration has become so expensive and overblown that it
was not worthwhile. 82 For example, Intel Corporation participated in a
lengthy and expensive pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration, including several
rounds of collateral litigation. The arbitration originated from a pre-dispute
clause, and the proceedings lasted seven years and cost them about $100
million due to the extended examination of witnesses that was required
because of limited pre-hearing discovery. 83 Also, a study of arbitrations
Fortune /000 Lawyers Comment on its Status and Future, 8 Bus. L. TODAY 24, 26
(Mar./Apr. 1999) (describing general arbitration, not mandatory arbitration programs).
79. Id.
80. See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at
55.
81. See Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A4-5 (May 14, 1997) (providing another survey of 530
Fortune 1000 companies from 1994 to 1997, finding that 79% of the respondents reported
having used arbitration, that 69% said they would use it again, that 66% found ADR provided
more "satisfactory settlements" than litigation, and that 59% found that ADR "preserves good
relationships"). Again, the issue of mandatory arbitration was not discussed by this survey.
See id.
82. See Brennan, supra note 18, at AI (describing complaints of outside counsel, John
Lowrey, regarding a particularly horrendous arbitration that was required to be held in New
York, even though one party was from California; the New York arbitrator refused to let the
parties go five straight days in a week because the arbitrator had his own private law practice
and the cost got so expensive that the case had to be settled).
83. See Reuben, supra note 80, at 58-59 (describing arbitration proceedings that took
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involving a California health maintenance organization found that
arbitrations typically took nearly twenty-nine months to complete in
comparison to the relevant trial court proceedings that lasted fifteen to
nineteen months.
84
With these ever-growing nightmarish experiences, one attorney recently
noted: "[a]rbitration is almost as costly as litigation, without the same
safeguards to achieve a fair result" because "[a]rbitration awards [cannot] be
appealed."'85 As a result of these concerns, some employers have refused to
arbitrate for fear that an arbitrator will not "care who is right and wrong"
and will just want to "come up with a compromise."'86
A 1996 Rand Corporation study of the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act
assessed six different ADR programs that included mediation and early
neutral evaluation and found that neither time nor costs were cut by these
ADR programs. 87 The Rand study analyzed a random sample of more than
12,000 case histories and survey responses from judges, 10,000 lawyers, and
approximately 5,000 litigants in thousands of cases, as well as data from
judges' time sheets, court records, and districts' plans.88
Because court-ordered arbitration differs from private arbitration by
creating another layer of procedure, the connection between the results from
the Rand study and private arbitration may be too attenuated. However, that
study also determined that, even if ADR reduces the time to reach a
decision, overall costs to the company depended on factors unrelated to the
time of resolution. These factors include the aggressiveness of counsel and
their tendency to try to do just as much work as they would in court
proceedings and filings, but over a shorter time period.89 The Rand study
place over seven years and included several rounds of collateral litigation); see also Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994 (1994); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 911 (1993) (describing the dispute as ongoing for five years at
that time); Schwartz, supra note 25, at 45 n.33 ("In practice, the notion of arbitration as a
'speedy' remedy compared to litigation is often illusory. Delays of months or years are
common.").
84. See Reuben, supra note 80, at 59.
85. Brennan, supra note 18, at Al.
86. Id. (noting comments of Bennie Laughter, vice-president and general counsel of
carpet manufacturer, Shaw Industries, Inc., in Daulton, Georgia, describing why his company
will "never arbitrate").
87. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL
EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 34-44 (1996).




continues to represent some of the best information available comparing the
use of ADR versus the courts. As one commentator recently noted:
[T]he empirical data garnered from experiments with arbitration of civil
disputes in the federal courts suggests that arbitration does not materially
save time or expense in prosecuting civil cases, and the parties' satisfaction
with this ADR device--to the extent that it can be accurately measured at
all-does not appear to be so high as to outweigh its uncertainties.
90
2. Developing Forum Fairness: The Protocol & Litigation-Like
Procedures
Concerns about mandatory arbitration have been raised from the
beginning and are continuing to create challenges to the use of arbitration
with respect to basic concerns of due process that are provided to parties in
the court system. 9 1 Initially, a Taskforce on Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Employment was created to address these concerns. The Taskforce
included representatives of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"), the National
Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA"), the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
("SPIDR"), the National Academy of Arbitrators ("NAA"), and the Labor
and Employment Law Section of the ABA.92 On May 9, 1995, the
Taskforce developed a document to address the growing concerns regarding
90. Johnathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in
Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 154 (1999)
(describing the results from the Rand study of court-annexed ADR systems).
91. Even in one of the most recent studies showing the increasing use of ADR, 54% of
the respondents who do not use ADR stated that their companies "do not use arbitration
because arbitrators' decisions are difficult to appeal ... discovery isn't required in the process
and arbitrators are not confined to standard legal rules, such as those governing the
admissibility of evidence." Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 78, at 27. The respondents of that
survey also noted a general lack of confidence in arbitrators stemming from concerns about
their qualifications and experience. Id.
92. See George Nicolau, Scrutiny of Arbitration Forums Focuses on Fairness, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at B7; Evan J. Spelfogel, A Focus On Fairness, Due Process in ADR,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at BI0 (finding that, absent Supreme Court clarification of the
arbitration of statutory employment disputes, the primary focus should be on the fairness of
the ADR process and its incorporation of the Due Process Protocol); see also Green, supra
note 30, at 174 nn. 10-13 (describing the ABA, AAA, SPIDR, JAMS/Endispute organizations,
and the make-up of their memberships). Professor Leona Green provides an excellent review
of the development of the Due Process Protocol and responses thereto. See id. at 211-2 1.
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the arbitration of employment disputes, entitled "A Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship."
93
The Protocol established minimum guidelines for procedures to ensure a
fair system for the arbitration of employment disputes, including
"fundamental due process safeguards, fair and appropriate discovery
procedures, the right of employees to be represented by counsel, and the
selection of an arbitrator who is neutral, familiar with the statutory issues
and authorized to grant the same remedies available in court." 94 The
impetus for the Protocol originated in 1994 with the Dunlop Commission on
Labor-Management Relations, a diverse group composed of persons from
management, employment, and government that made recommendations
about important labor and employment issues to the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and the Secretary of the Department of Commerce. 9
5
The Dunlop Commission encouraged the use of arbitration, but
recommended that agreements requiring arbitration of employment
discrimination claims as a condition of employment should not be
enforced. 96 Nevertheless, the Protocol Taskforce struggled with a clear
recommendation on how to address the issue of mandatory arbitration and
could not agree on a compromise.
97
93. Green, supra note 30, at 211 & nn.258-61.
94. Spelfogel, supra note 92, at BI0 (describing the requirements of the Protocol).
95. See Nicolau, supra note 92, at B7.
96. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and
Recommendations-Final Report, at 33, § 4(2)(3) (1994) (photocopy on file with author),
available in Catherwood Library-Electronic Archive (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/lib/e-archive/Dunlop/section4.html> (stating findings from the
group commonly known as the Dunlop Commission, named after its chair, former Secretary
of Labor John Dunlop, that, despite the Gilmer decision, their recommendation was that
binding arbitration agreements should not be enforceable as a condition of employment and
should be interpreted that way or Congress should pass legislation making it clear that
arbitration is to be pursued only if the employee chooses it not as part of an employment
contract).
97. See Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship (May 9, 1995)
(visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.naarb.org/protocol.html>; see also A Due Process
Protocol for Resolving Employment Disputes Involving Statutory Rights, Disp. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37-39 (describing the four distinct and conflicting options offered by the
Protocol Taskforce to address the use of arbitration to resolve employment disputes including:
(I) pre-dispute arbitration with an informed, voluntary agreement to arbitrate that is not
agreed to as a condition of employment; (2) mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration as a condition
of employment; (3) absolute prohibition of any agreement permitting employees to waive
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Since the Protocol Taskforce's failure to reach a compromise about
mandatory arbitration, the ACLU has challenged the use of mandatory
arbitration through lawsuits filed in California. 98 Also, NELA "issued an
ultimatum to AAA and JAMS: [e]ither those brokerages stop handling cases
arising from mandatory and binding predispute resolution clauses, or
NELA's lawyers would boycott those companies' arbitrators whenever
possible."99 The NAA debated the mandatory arbitration matter and issued a
statement condemning the use of mandatory arbitration, but it still agreed to
participate in those employment arbitrations as long as the protections from
the Protocol existed. 100 SPIDR also agreed with the NAA's condemnation
of mandatory arbitration. 10 1 Moreover, the National Employee Rights
Institute ("NERI") issued a statement condemning the use of mandatory
arbitration. 102 Key arbitration service providers, including AAA and
JAMS/Endispute, agreed to adopt the Protocol requirements and have
developed their own procedures consistent with the Protocol. 10 3 After the
their right to judicial relief of statutory employment discrimination claims; or (4) post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims); see also Green, supra note 30, at 212 n.265
(discussing the four competing options to address mandatory arbitration about which the
Protocol Taskforce could not reach a consensus).
98. See Paul W. Cane, Jr. & E. Jeffrey Grube, Employment Dispute Arbitration: An
Antidote to Frivolous Litigation, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER; Nov. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Database (describing two lawsuits filed by the ACLU in California against law firms
that used pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment).
99. Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1996, at 58-60.
100. On May 21, 1997, the NAA adopted its own guidelines in support of the Due
Process Protocol, "Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under Employer-
Promulgated Systems" and criticized the use of mandatory arbitration, "Statement of the
National Academy of Arbitrators on Individual Contracts of Employment." See Academy
Votes to Oppose Mandatory Arbitration of Job Disputes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at
El (May 29, 1997); see also NAA Website <http://www.naarb.org/guidelines.html>. The
NAA's guidelines went beyond the Due Process Protocol to create a fair system from initial
selection of the arbitrator to the issuance of a written opinion. See id.; see also Nicolau, supra
note 92, at B7.
101. See SPIDR, Statement On Arbitration of Statutory Rights Imposed As A
Condition of Employment (Jan. 24, 1998). The statement is available on the Internet at
<http://www.mediate.com/spidr/work.htm#7> (visited Feb. 28, 2000).
102. See NERI's Position on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, I EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 263 (1997).
103. See Bingham, supra note 25, at 230 (discussing adoption of protocol items by
American Arbitration Association); see also Michael D. Young & Kathleen W. Marcel,
Arbitration of Employment Disputes What's a Company to Do?, THE METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Aug. 1998, at I (describing the JAMS/Endispute's minimum standards
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adoption of the Protocol, employment arbitration's evidentiary and general
procedures have become more like those procedures available to parties in
court litigation. 104
3. Political Backlash
The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") have now adopted policies banning their
longstanding requirements of mandatory arbitration. 105 Political pressure
played a big role in the reversal of the mandatory arbitration policies, as
members of Congress signed a letter condemning its use, which was sent to
the NASD. 106 The NASD and NYSE actions have essentially resulted in the
for Mandatory Employment Arbitration Program, including the requirement that all remedies
available under the applicable law must remain available in arbitration, the arbitrator must be
neutral and the employee must have the right to participate in the selection of the arbitrator,
the employee must have the right to be represented by counsel, reasonable discovery must be
available, the parties must each have the right to present evidence, and the costs of the
proceeding must not preclude the employee's access to the process); Arnold M. Zack, The
Evolution of the Employment Protocol, DisP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 36 (describing the
adoption of the Protocol by the AAA); see also Arbitration Rules Force Debate, DALLAS
MORN. NEWS, July 20, 1998, at 2D (describing the AAA employment arbitration minimum
standards). The AAA website contains its rules titled: "National Rules For The Resolution of
Employment Disputes (Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules)," which were effective
January 1, 1999. See American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.adr.org/rules/employment/employ-
ment rules.html>.
104. See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary
Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998)
(proposing the establishment of certain procedures that would make arbitration closer to
litigation).
105. See Arbitration: SEC Approves NASD Proposal To End Mandatory Arbitration
of Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-10 (June 24, 1998); see also 63 Fed.
Reg. 35,299 (1998) (NASD); 64 Fed. Reg. 1051 (1998) (NYSE); New York Stock Exchange
Moves to End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-2
(Sept. 8, 1998); Patrick McGeehan, Big Board Moves To End Practice On Arbitration, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 4, 1998, at B6. But see Scott S. Moore, Arbitration of Employment Disputes-
Drafting Enforceable Pre-Dispute Agreements, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1999)
(referring to the change of rules and prohibition of mandatory arbitration by the NYSE and
NASD as a "small political victory" and suggesting that mandatory arbitration is still a
legitimate and viable option for employers).
106. See Legislators Criticize Mandatory Arbitration of Job Bias Complaints in
Securities Industry, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 127, at D-I I (July 2, 1997) (discussing a
June 27, 1997 letter to the president of NASD Regulation, Inc., a subsidiary of NASD, calling
for the end of mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination disputes in the securities
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abandonment of mandatory arbitration in the securities industry, despite
authorization of it by Gilmer.107 The NYSE and NASD policy changes
represent classic examples of how repeat players encompassing an entire
industry can buckle under political pressure and protests from employee
groups. Those groups had argued that the widespread use of mandatory
arbitration policies was intended to shield an entire industry from
discrimination lawsuits. Likewise, no large employer or group of large
employers covering a particular industry want a similar political backlash of
becoming targets for civil rights groups or under the specific scrutiny of
Congress due to their use of mandatory arbitration policies. '
0 8
industry that was signed by 30 members of Congress); see also SEC to Monitor Securities
Firms' Forum Choice for Resolving Employee Bias Claims, 1 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at 74 (Aug. 5, 1998) (describing statements of Securities and Exchange Commissioner
Isaac C. Hunt to a Senate panel indicating that the SEC intends to monitor securities firms to
see if they are forcing employees to agree, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims); NASD Votes to Eliminate Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at AA-I (Aug. 8, 1997) (describing how NASD bowed to
the pressure from "members of Congress, civil rights advocates, and plaintiffs' attorneys" in
voting to eliminate mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims for
registered brokers).
107. See Judge Approves Merrill Lynch Accord Ending Mandatory Arbitration of
Disputes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 171, at A-I (Sept. 3, 1998) (discussing approved
settlement in Cremin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. III. 1997), which
creates a separate resolution process for handling all future civil rights claims where
employees have the option of pursuing court relief and mediation and arbitration). Although
the actions by the NASD and NYSE still allow individual brokerage firms to establish their
own mandatory arbitration programs, the reality is that due to the competitive nature of the
securities industry, the Merrill Lynch program established by the Cremin settlement has
effectively eliminated mandatory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination disputes
in the securities industry. See also Rosalyn Retkwa, Forced Arbitration Under Attack,
REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE, Aug. 1998, available in LEXIS, News database (noting that
NASD and NYSE were pressured by state and federal officials into changing their rules to
prohibit mandatory arbitration and although individual securities firms could still choose to
employ mandatory arbitration agreements the likelihood is that mandatory arbitration is over
in the securities industry with Merrill Lynch's announcement that its new ADR program
allows its employees to pursue court claims for employment discrimination because it would
"put their competitors at a disadvantage in recruiting" if Merrill Lynch allowed this freedom
and its competitors did not offer it); Securities Industry Throwing In the Towel on
Compulsory Arbitration, LITIG. NEWS, Mar. 1999, at 10 (referring to the new rules of the
NASD and NYSE that repealed prior mandatory arbitration requirements and noting that
Paine Webber has followed Merrill Lynch so that both have removed their employment
contracts provisions mandating arbitration of employment discrimination claims).
108. For that matter, small employers would not want to be the target of civil rights
groups or Congress either. But given their size, that is less likely.
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4. Lower Court Hostility: Additional Search for Forum Fairness?
Whatever benefits in cost and time that arbitration may allegedly
provide, mandatory arbitration destroys those purported benefits. A
newfound judicial hostility has developed to the point where some courts
have decided that these mandatory agreements are unenforceable when they
are too one-sided in not providing for the same remedies or similar
procedures as available in the courts. 109 This fairness concern originates
from the fact that in mandatory arbitration employees may not have
knowingly chosen to have their case resolved in arbitration because they
were required to accept arbitration as a condition of employment. Now if a
court finds that the arbitral forum designed by the employer restricts or
prohibits certain rights that the employee would have been able to pursue in
court, courts are striking these mandatory arbitration agreements as patently
unfair. I 10
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit addressed the issue of whether mandatory arbitration of Title VII
claims is enforceable in light of the remedies provided by the Act. Chief
Judge Harry Edwards, a well-known labor lawyer and professor before he
became a member of the judiciary, wrote the opinion in Cole v. Burns
International Securities Services.i I 1
The court in Cole enforced an agreement to arbitrate a Title VII job
discrimination claim, but created a new requirement of establishing certain
"minimum standards" for arbitrations of statutory claims when the
arbitration is a mandatory condition of employment. These standards,
109. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (deciding
that the mandatory arbitration agreement was unenforceable because, in part, Hooters failed to
provide employees with the complete written terms of the proposed agreement, threatened its
employees' careers if they refused to execute the agreement, and the agreement unlawfully
prohibited any court review by employees despite stating that the FAA governed the terms of
the agreement); see also Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding arbitration agreement was an unenforceable adhesion agreement under California law
because it was too one-sided in only allowing the employer to challenge decisions in court);
Alexandra Varney McDonald, Escape from Arbitration: Sticking Points in Adhesion
Contracts Ruled 'Unfair', A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 32 (discussing the Hooters case).
110. See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at 933. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding
that the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended to preclude compulsory
and mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims under Title VII, as discussed
earlier, represents another form of the growing judicial hostility. See Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). But this form of hostility is limited as no
other Court of Appeals has adopted this approach yet.
111. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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derived from procedures of the Dunlop Commission, include: the
requirement of a neutral arbitrator knowledgeable in relevant law; a fair
method to obtain necessary information to establish a claim; an affordable
access to the process, which may require payment by employers of the full
costs of the arbitrator's fees when use of arbitration is imposed as a
condition of employment, because having to pay for the arbitration would
deter its use and "undermine Congress's intent" when plaintiffs do not have
to pay judges in the judicial forum; a right to legal representation; a right to
the same remedies as those remedies available in litigation; a written
opinion by the arbitrator explaining the reasons for the award; and the right
to sufficient judicial review to ensure compliance with governing statutory
rights.' 12 All of these standards assure that the arbitral forum approximates
the minimum guarantees that plaintiffs usually have available to them in the
court system.
The last standard can include the traditional scope of review of
arbitration awards under the FAA that is essentially limited to acts of fraud
or misconduct' 13 or the court-made standard of allowing a showing of
"manifest disregard of the law" to overturn an arbitrator's decision by
judicial review. 114 The Cole court insisted that courts ensure meaningful
112. Id. at 1482-83, 1485 & n.I I (describing procedures proffered by the Dunlop
Commission). Other cases have followed Cole by requiring some of the minimum standards
of fairness identified therein. See, e.g., Ramirez-de-Arellano v. American Airlines, Inc., 133
F.3d 89, 91 (1 st Cir. 1997) (requiring notice, discovery, unbiased arbitrators, and meaningful
review for wage and hour claims); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th
Cir. 1997) (requiring "neutral arbitrators, adequate discovery" for Title VII claims).
113. Under the FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated on a number of grounds,
including: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; and (4) where
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. See 9 U.S.C. §
10(a) (1 994).
114. The definition and application of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard of
review has become a bit elusive. Compare Halligan v. Piper Jaffray Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding a failure of an arbitration panel to rule in favor of plaintiff despite strong
evidence of discrimination was in manifest disregard of the law), with Dirussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997) (deciding that failure of an arbitration panel to
provide the prevailing party an award of attorneys' fees does not constitute manifest disregard
of the law). See also Michael A. Landrum & Dean A. Trongard, Judicial Morphallaxis:
Mandatory Arbitration and Statutory Rights, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 345, 373-80 (1998)
(discussing the confusing "manifest disregard of law" standard and how courts have struggled
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review of public law issues and may set aside arbitral awards if they violate
explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant. 115 Recent
indications suggest that litigators are becoming more successful in obtaining
meaningful review of arbitration decisions, and the courts are now setting
aside arbitration awards in some instances. 116 Also, a number of courts have
followed the Cole reasoning. These courts have required certain minimum
standards of fairness and refused to enforce arbitration agreements where
employees had to pay excessive arbitration fees that they would not have
had to pay in court 117 or where the same remedies available in court were
denied the parties in arbitration. I 18
to apply it); Norman S. Poser, Arbitration: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest
Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 471 (1998) (questioning the logic of applying the
manifest disregard of the law as a standard of review for arbitration decisions under the FAA).
115. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486.
116. See Ethan A. Brecher, Putting the Reins on Employment Arbitration: Courts
Safeguard Employee Rights, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 24, 1999, at I (describing recent cases where
issues of fairness have concerned the courts enough to overturn arbitration decisions as a
manifest disregard of the law or as ignoring traditional notions of fairness).
117. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable where the
employee, a janitor, was required to pay about $2,000 to $5,000 for one-half the arbitration
fees because when he could not afford the fee it served as a significant barrier to his pursuit of
his claim); Paladino v. Avnet Comp. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060-62 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(Cox, J., concurring, for a majority of the court) (finding that mandatory arbitration
agreements banning key Title VII statutory remedies are unenforceable including those
imposing "steep. filing fees" and "fee-shifting" agreements requiring a financial obligation
similar to the one placed on the plaintiff in this case who was required to pay a $2,000 filing
fee and incur possible liability for a portion of the arbitrator's fee); McWilliams v. Logicon,
Inc., No. 95-2500, 1997 WL 383150 (D. Kan. June 4, 1997), aff'd, 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir.
1998) (requiring that an employer must pay all fees and expenses of the arbitration that the
employee was required to use as a condition of employment). But see Arakawa v. Japan
Network Group, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding the possibility that plaintiff
might be charged arbitration fees as part of a fee-splitting agreement did not make the
arbitration agreement unenforceable since it was not clear that the fee-splitting agreement
would prevent the plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights); Howard v. Anderson, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that improper assessment of fees should be raised with
the arbitrator and having to pay $500 up front was not a barrier to the vindication of the
plaintiff's statutory rights in arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement).
118. See DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that arbitration agreements which fail to award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties are
unenforceable as against the public policy of Title VII and are in manifest disregard of the law
if they prohibit attorneys' fees to a prevailing party as required by Title VII); see also
Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1060 (finding an arbitration agreement that eliminates the availability
of certain Title VII damages is unenforceable because it is "fundamentally at odds with the
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5. Aggressive Agency Challenges
The EEOC represents probably the most significant deterrent and
disadvantage for employers seeking to use mandatory arbitration
agreements. Although it has enthusiastically endorsed the use of mediation
to resolve employment discrimination disputes, 119 the EEOC has
maintained a longstanding policy against mandatory arbitration agreements,
and it continues to vigorously challenge the legality of mandatory arbitration
agreements. 120 Pursuant to its policy, the EEOC will ignore the existence of
an arbitration agreement when it processes a charge against an employer,
purposes of Title VII"); cf Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1365 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding that arbitration must allow remedies central to the statutory scheme but not the
exact same remedies as in adjudication, while affirming an arbitration award after finding that
a foreign arbitral forum's different remedies met the statutory purposes involved because "the
available remedies are adequate and the potential recoveries substantial").
119. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC's New Nationwide Mediation Plan Offers Options
of Informal Settlements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at C-I (Feb. 12, 1999) (discussing
the EEOC's wholesale efforts to increase the use of mediation to resolve charges that have
been filed and how the EEOC's mediation program operates).
120. The EEOC issued a policy statement in 1995 opposing the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. Two years later, "the EEOC reiterated
its opposition to mandatory arbitration agreements and restated its commitment to challenging
the legality of these agreements in the courts, even in cases where the employee has agreed to
abide by such a contract." Mark Hansen, Contract Disputes: EEOC Reaffirms Policy
Favoring Judges Over Arbitrators for Workplace Discrimination Claims, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1997, at 26. On July 10, 1997, the EEOC issued a 17-page policy statement reaffirming its
prior opposition to the use of mandatory arbitration. See Excerpts From Text: EEOC Rejects
Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, DIsp. RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 11 (providing
excerpts of the position statement). The full position statement may be found on the EEOC
website. See EEOC, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.txt> [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement]; see also
EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at E-4 (July II,
1997). A number of commentators have criticized the EEOC's position. See, e.g., Lynne M.
Longtin, The EEOC'S Position on Mandatory Arbitration, 67 U. CrN. L. REV. 265 (1998)
(discussing the EEOC's policy statement opposing mandatory arbitration and criticizing the
EEOC's position); Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 75 (disagreeing same); Beth M.
Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. EMP. L. 151 (1999) (disagreeing with the EEOC's
policy and suggesting that mandatory arbitration may work with certain procedural safeguards
already in place under the Due Process Protocol adopted by most ADR providers). But see
Joseph D. Garrison, The Employee 's Perspective: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes
Little More Than a Waiver of a Worker's Rights, Disp. RESOL. J., Fall 1997, at 15 (arguing
that the EEOC's position opposing mandatory arbitration is well-deserved).
432 [Vol. 31:399
2000] MANDATORY ARBITRATION FOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 433
and it will file amicus briefs in cases involving mandatory arbitration
issues. 12 1 In addition to filing amicus briefs in other lawsuits, the EEOC
started to challenge the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements
directly through its own lawsuits. With respect to its attempts to obtain
injunctive relief, the EEOC has been generally successful despite the
existence of mandatory arbitration agreements because courts have
recognized the EEOC's independent authority to enforce discrimination
claims as a public body regardless of the private agreements of individual
employees with their employers. 
122
In Gilmer, the Court made it clear that an individual subject to an
arbitration agreement is still free to file an EEOC charge and that arbitration
agreements "will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking
class-wide and equitable relief." 123 Although Gilmer was silent on the scope
of relief the EEOC may seek, the EEOC has taken the position that its
enforcement actions vindicate the broader public interest in eradicating
employment discrimination. 12 4 With recent judicial support, the EEOC has
121. See Ellen J. Vargyas, EEOC Explains its Decision: Verdict on Mandatory
Arbitration in Employment, DisP. REsOL. J., Fall 1997, at 10 (explaining the EEOC's
reasoning); see also EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 120 (explaining same). At an annual
conference on current developments in employment law held on July 17, 1997, EEOC
Associate General Counsel Peggy Mastroianni stated, "Mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes is the greatest threat to civil rights enforcement, and is why the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission is devoting 'a lot' of energy in the area." Nadya Aswad, EEOC
Attorney Calls Mandatory Arbitration 'Greatest Threat' to Civil Rights Enforcement, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at D-13 (July 21, 1997).
122. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999) (preventing
the defendant from compelling the EEOC to arbitrate the individual employee's
discrimination claims, allowing the EEOC to seek injunctive relief but precluding the EEOC
from seeking any "make-whole" monetary relief for individuals subject to arbitration
agreements); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding EEOC was
denied the opportunity to seek legal damages but received injunctive relief in an ADEA suit
on behalf of a class of employees who had signed arbitration agreements); EEOC v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, No. H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995)
(describing how the EEOC successfully obtained a permanent injunction against an employer
that forced employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements and either terminated those
employees who would not sign or refused to hire others who would not sign after 21 of its
employees filed discrimination charges).
123. 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
124. See, e.g., Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 805 (seeking broad relief in EEOC suit);
Kidder, Peabody, 156 F.3d at 298 (seeking same relief). Given the tremendous battle and
another hard-fought victory to give the EEOC this power, it is understandable that the
EEOC's enforcement authority is more important than an individual claim. See Herbert Hill,
The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the
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also been successful in challenging these agreements by obtaining both
injunctive and compensatory relief against employers, regardless of the
compulsory agreements to arbitrate. 
12 5
In EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts,] 26 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of the EEOC's authority to
seek both monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of an individual, even if
that individual was a party to a mandatory arbitration agreement. Because
the court found that the EEOC had the right to pursue money damages, in
addition to injunctive relief, the Court in Frank's Nursery disregarded the
earlier ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co.127 In Kidder, Peabody, the EEOC filed an ADEA suit on
behalf of a class of employees. The Second Circuit granted injunctive relief,
but denied monetary relief. Specifically, the court held that where an
"individual has freely agreed to arbitrate [his] ADEA claim, that decision,
like the decision to waive or settle a claim, prevents the EEOC from
pursuing monetary remedies on behalf of the individual in the federal
forum."
12 8
Nevertheless, in Frank's Nursery, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Kidder,
Peabody approach and decided that, pursuant to the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, which authorized the EEOC to bring independent court actions for
the public interest, the EEOC could pursue not only injunctive relief, but
Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. I, 7, 51-52 (1977); see
also James E. Jones, Jr., Some Reflections on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at
Twenty, 36 MERCER L. REv. 813, 819-20 nn.32 & 35 (1985) (describing the compromise
involved with the 1964 Act that became Title VII and noting that the 1964 Act was believed
to be "far short of that hoped for" because, instead of creating an exclusive federal
commission with cease and desist powers similar to the National Labor Relations Board, it
only granted the newly-created agency, the EEOC, a right to investigate and conciliate, but
not the right to prosecute cases and seek enforcement, which was left up to individual
lawsuits brought by an aggrieved plaintiff); Belton, supra note 29, at 957 (referring to
description of Title Vl1 as a "toothless tiger" before the 1972 amendments that gave the
EEOC the power to bring suits and seek judicial enforcement of Title VII).
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that employee's signing of a mandatory arbitration agreement did not preclude the
EEOC from seeking monetary and injunctive relief against employer); see also EEOC v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 703 (6th Cir. 1999) (Nelson, J., concurring) (agreeing
with opinion following Frank's Nursery and allowing monetary and injunctive relief to be
pursued by the EEOC in light of Frank's Nursery, but noting that the parties in Frank's
Nursery settled before the matter could be appealed).
126. 177 F.3d at 448.
127. 156 F.3d at 298.
128. Id. at302.
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also monetary relief on behalf of the individual claimant. 129 Unlike the
court in Kidder, Peabody, the Frank's Nursery court found that the
importance of the EEOC's independent right to file suits under Title VII
would be compromised if it could not obtain monetary relief, even if the
employees who filed the charges had agreed to arbitrate. 130 Pursuant to
Frank's Nursery, a mandatory arbitration agreement will be virtually useless
to an employer. The agreement will not preclude the EEOC from processing
the matter or wielding its considerable influence to challenge an employer's
actions in court for monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of the employee
who agreed to arbitrate under a mandatory arbitration agreement.
Similar to the EEOC, the National Labor Relations Board has also
opposed mandatory arbitration agreements. 131 These governmental agency
actions indicate an ongoing effort to ensure that the courts play a key role in
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements that handle statutory
employment discrimination claims. 132 Also, with the continuous court
challenges to the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements, hostility
to such agreements by government agencies, and wholesale attacks by
scholars, civil rights activists, and members of Congress, 133 employers have
little certainty regarding the legality of any mandatory arbitration
agreements that they may choose to adopt for their employees. Such
uncertainty about mandatory arbitration suggests that "employers would be
129. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 447-49 (discussing the EEOC's authority in Title
VII cases).
130. See id. at 466.
131. See Tanya A. Yatsco, Comment, How About a Real Answer? Mandatory
Arbitration as a Condition of Employment and the National Labor Relations Board's Stance,
62 ALB. L. REV. 257 (1998) (describing the full scope of the Board's stance on mandatory
arbitration and suggesting that the Board reverse its position and support the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration agreements); see also Margaret A. Jacobs, Firms With Policies
Requiring Arbitration are Facing Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B6 (discussing
the separate challenges to mandatory arbitration authorized by both the EEOC and the
NLRB).
132. See Carolyn L. Wheeler, Issues in Employment and Labor Law: Foreword.
Courts' Central Role in Implementing Equal Employment Opportunity, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1501, 1504 (1999) (referring to statements of an assistant general counsel of the EEOC
asserting the significance of the courts' role in fleshing out equal employment laws and the
need to "revisit the question of the propriety of submitting questions and cases arising out of
our nation's commitment to equal employment opportunity to arbitration rather than to
Article III judges").
133. Although a number of gallant attempts to block or limit the effect of Gilmer have
occurred in both Congress and state legislatures, none of those efforts have been successful in
passing new legislation. See generally Ray, supra note 30, at 459-62.
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wise to avoid mandatory arbitration as a component of an internal ADR
system for the time being and opt instead for programs of mediation or
voluntary arbitration."1
34
6. Comparing Any Remaining Benefits with the Disadvantages
Although not generally used as part of the employer advantage rhetoric,
there are assumptions that employers prefer arbitration because of the
privacy of the proceedings and the limited discovery. 135 These purported
preferences suggest benefits for employers in arbitration; however, they also
create similar disadvantages. Because of these disadvantages, the use of
mandatory arbitration instead of litigation is not warranted, especially given
the other disadvantages already discussed.
Some critics have complained about the use of mandatory arbitration
because it keeps certain decisions private and out of the public discourse. 
13 6
That might be a legitimate concern from an employee's perspective or from
an overall reflection on understanding the public values of employment
discrimination jurisprudence through a review of public precedents.
However, the goal of keeping discrimination disputes private, albeit an aim
of many employers, cannot be realistically obtained. Even an employer with
a mandatory arbitration agreement cannot prevent public discussion of the
dispute. It is not practical for an employer to expect that the dispute will
remain private absent a separate agreement to keep the matter confidential,
which is part and parcel of most private settlement agreements. 137
134. Manuszak, supra note 25, at 415.
135. See Bompey et al., supra note 12, at 34-38 (describing the pros and cons of
arbitration and listing privacy and limited discovery as purported benefits for employers).
Another purported advantage is lower attorneys' fees, which is discussed infra section 11I.
136. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81,
85 (1992) (describing the private nature of arbitration and its perceived benefits by the
parties); see also Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62
BROOK. L. REv. 1459, 1483-84 (1996) (lamenting a lack of public awareness in securities
industry arbitrations, which are mostly private affairs with little publicity absent some SEC
oversight which allows some public airing of major developments); Schwartz, supra note 25,
at 61 (describing why corporations like the privacy aspects of arbitration).
137. But see Brenda Rios, Edison Bias Suits Settled: Employees in 3 Class Actions to
Split $45.15 Million, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 29, 1999, at I E (describing how arbitrators
ordered the Detroit Edison utility company to pay salaried employees $45.15 million to settle
1,400 current and former employees' class action based on an age and race discrimination suit
where the employer agreed with the public disclosure of the award and used arbitrators to
come up with a fair resolution as a settlement of the dispute).
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In reviewing the privacy issue, Professor Stipanowich stated:
While arbitrations are less likely to be the subject of press coverage than
civil litigation, publicity may attend preliminary court proceedings or
judicial appeals of arbitration awards. And while members of the press may
be excluded from arbitration hearings, they still have opportunities to gather
information if a dispute is particularly newsworthy; there is nothing to keep a
party who wishes a controversy to be made public from going to the news
media with details of the dispute. Moreover, although a party may be
protected to some degree from the collateral estoppel effects of an award in
third party litigation, it may still be possible for third parties to obtain
transcripts of sworn testimony from the arbitration for use in later
proceedings. 138
Under the same circumstances that Professor Stipanowich has identified
and despite the privacy of mandatory arbitration, a number of high-profile
cases resolved in arbitration have still become part of the public
discourse. 13 9 Thus, while employers may hope that there will be some
138. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 447
(1988) (footnote omitted).
139. In a key example, a well-known Chicago law firm used a mandatory arbitration
clause to resolve a discrimination dispute with one of its former African-American partners.
See Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Il1. 1993). One would
assume that this firm would not want the results of that case to become part of public
discourse in light of a highly-publicized discrimination case brought by another African-
American attorney alleging discrimination against the same firm. See Mungin v. Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Williams case, however, became
public knowledge due to the Mungin case. Despite the fact that Williams was compelled to
arbitrate her Title VII claims, her testimony became public knowledge. See PAUL BARRETT,
THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 1, 285 (1999) (describing the details
of the Mungin case and referring to the results of the Williams case in arbitration including
Williams' testimony at Mungin's trial about what happened to her). Also, other details about
what happened in arbitration were divulged when Williams challenged the arbitrator's rulings
by seeking review in federal court. See Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, No. 92 C 5654,
1996 WL 717447 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (denying Williams' motion to set aside arbitrators'
award due to limits on discovery, including a refusal to allow the deposition of three
witnesses, assessment of arbitration costs, and failure to assess compensatory damages
requests, but entering judgment confirming the arbitration award and noting key facts
regarding what happened at arbitration including that: (1) arbitration took place over 9 days,
and (2) Williams lost her discrimination claims, but won her retaliation claim, which resulted
in an award of compensatory damages of four months of disability salary continuation
benefits in the amount of $37,000, plus $1,754 in interest, and punitive damages in the
amount of $74,000).
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benefit to private resolution by mandatory arbitration, the only guarantee of
privacy would be through some contractual agreement to keep the results
private. Regardless of whether such agreements would be enforceable, the
likelihood that employers would go to such aims in light of the threat of
litigation does not bode well for such agreements. Thus, from an employer's
perspective, the privacy of arbitration may be a benefit, but it is a benefit
that employers cannot guarantee unless it is part of a negotiated
settlement. 
14 0
Likewise, the issue of discovery represents a double-edged concern.
Commentators concerned about employees' rights have criticized
arbitration's limited discovery as a hindrance to plaintiffs and an added
benefit to those employers who will not be exposed to lengthy and difficult
discovery requests, an essential part of developing a plaintiff's case. 14 1 It is
140. Also, because the EEOC can still pursue suits independently and it is under no
obligation to adhere to any private agreements, an employer will still be subject to having its
dispute become part of a public discussion. See, e.g., Ross Kerber, Arbitrator Hits Raytheon
in Bias Case; Says Firm Discriminated Against Several Women, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11,
1999, at C20 (describing results from an arbitrator's award against Raytheon provided to the
newspaper by the claimants' attorney along with a responsive document filed by Raytheon in
response to an accompanying EEOC charge even though Raytheon refused to respond to the
reporter's requests for the information it filed with the arbitrator). Another example involving
a law firm demonstrates the premise that, despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, a
filing of an EEOC charge will open up the entire matter to public scrutiny. See Michael D.
Goldhaber, Bryan Cave in Sex Bias Mess, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A4 (describing a sex
discrimination charge that a female associate filed against her former firm, despite the finn's
claim that she must adhere to the arbitration agreement and the creative way she brought this
matter to public attention by discussing it in a federal court action seeking a temporary
restraining order against the employer for allegedly trying to use the arbitration agreement to
prevent her from pursuing the matter with the EEOC).
141. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 69, at 147 (noting the lack of discovery as one of
the reasons why the EEOC has stated its opposition to mandatory arbitration). A classic
example of the limited discovery concern occurred in Williams v. Katten, Muchin, & Zavis,
where the arbitrator made several rulings prohibiting the plaintiff from deposing three key
employees of the defendant, including one of the name partners, Michael Zavis. Williams,
1996 WL 717447, at *3 n.6. While there is certainly a possible letdown in not deposing the
three witnesses, there is empirical support for the fact that discovery does not affect the
litigation's outcome in the ways that most people assume. See also Judith A. McKenna &
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REv. 785, 796
(1998) (discussing empirical studies finding that the more days plaintiffs spent in discovery,
the lower their recovery was relative to expectations, while the number of days spent in
discovery for defendants was independent of the amount they were ultimately liable to pay);
David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 110-16
(1983) (finding that increased lawyer time spent on discovery was associated with decreased
measures of success for plaintiffs).
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also true, however, that limited discovery creates a difficult burden for
employers. 142
An employer's focus in the litigation process is to get the case dismissed
on summary judgment without having to go to trial. In line with that
objective, employers are very good at using the discovery process to hold
the plaintiffs feet to the fire and locking in the plaintiff's story to support a
summary judgment motion. With limited discovery, an employer has no idea
what the story might be when the plaintiff presents it to the arbitrator or
what little "Perry Mason" surprises or smoking guns might be brought
forward at the last minute without the employer having time to prepare a
response. 143 If you are talking about defending a company from an award of
several thousand dollars, possibly even millions, you want to know the
plaintiff's theory of the case well before you have to present your defense to
the decisionmaker. The right to "[t]ake depositions early in litigation and use
the plaintiff's own words to prove that the challenged reason [for an adverse
employment decision] was nondiscriminatory" is essential, because "if you
know your rules of evidence, you can win a case just on evidentiary
issues." 144 In arbitration, employers may lose these options due to its
limited discovery.
Also, to the extent that plaintiffs will likely be unrepresented in
arbitration, employers would benefit tremendously by being able to use the
well-defined federal court discovery rules to rein in a plaintiff, use the
discovery process to control any abuses, and file a motion for summary
judgment to dismiss the matter. 145 Although it is no small matter, as a
whole, the loss of discovery by and large has to be a disadvantage for an
employer as the stronger party who has given up one of its strong
142. In fact, many of the surveys of employer interest in ADR have noted that
employers are less interested in arbitration because of its limited discovery. See, e.g., Lipsky
& Seeber, supra note 78, at 27 ("Many corporate lawyers worry about arbitration because
discovery isn't required in the process and arbitrators are not confined to standard legal rules,
such as those governing the admissibility of evidence.").
143. See Bompey et al., supra note 12, at 36 (describing employer disadvantages from
lack of discovery including likelihood of a "Perry Mason style surprise").
144. Leslie King, Summary Judgment In Bias Cases Should Be Used With Caution,
Judge Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at D-20 (Aug. 8, 1997); see also Melissa A.
Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the
Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 432-42
(1994) (describing the scope of the summary judgment process in employment discrimination
matters for defendant employers).
145. See Bompey et al., supra note 12, at 35-36 (describing the loss of summary
judgment proceedings as an enormous disadvantage for employers).
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advantages even if the employee has also given up a strong advantage. The
reality is that there will be very few instances when an employer faces a
well-represented opponent with the skills to adequately use the discovery
process to hold the employer's feet to the fire. 
14 6
Based on increasing legal challenges and overall uncertainty about
enforceability, the fears of many employers regarding lawsuits have created
a recent hesitancy to adopt mandatory arbitration programs. 147 Other new
legal challenges 14 8 may crop up soon, including unique claims from people
146. See also Sherwyn et al., supra note 69, at 147 (asserting that one of the benefits
for employees of limited discovery is that it prevents employers from "big firming"
employees and driving up the cost of plaintiffs' claims).
147. Some employers rushed to judgment and adopted mandatory arbitration
agreements immediately. After Gilmer spawned enormous criticism, many employers became
increasingly skeptical about the costs of mandatory arbitration. See Joseph P. Beckman,
Courts Cooling To Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, LITIG. NEWS, Mar. 1999,
at 1, 10 (describing the Duffield and Wright decisions as evidence of a "clear pullback" from
Gilmer and noting that the question of mandatory arbitration is becoming an academic
exercise in the securities industry since that industry has stopped requiring it); Dominic
Bencivenga, Mandatory Arbitration: Are Programs Dead or Just in Need of Repair?,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1998, at 5 (describing how employers have been humbled by the legal
challenges and the reverberations from the NASD and NYSE decisions to end mandatory
arbitration so that they are "less likely to choose it in a knee-jerk fashion"); Brecher, supra
note 116, at I (describing numerous court decisions limiting the scope of mandatory
arbitration clauses); Evan J. Charkes, Recent Court Decisions Demonstrate that Mandatory
Arbitration is Waning, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1999, at I (suggesting that the future of mandatory
arbitration is in doubt); Ben L. Kaufnan, Courts Collide on Discrimination; When Suing the
Boss is Against the Rules, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 11, 1999, at C02, available in 1999 WL
9445090 (describing the Frank's Nursery case and how the EEOC may still sue employers for
damages even if the individual employees have a mandatory arbitration agreement with their
employer); Nancy Erika Smith, Is the Bell Tolling For Mandatory Arbitration?, N.J. LAW.
MAG., Apr. 12, 1999, at 8; Supreme Court Ruling May Dilute Industry Arbitration
Agreements, REG. REPRESENTATIVE, Jan. 1999, available in LEXIS, News database
(describing the Wright decision and noting a possible shift in the current presumption that
agreements to arbitrate are enforceable).
148. See Miriam A. Cherry, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts that Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 267, 280-84 (1998) (arguing that mandatory arbitration policies force women to give up
certain statutory protections and claiming that such policies can create disparate impact
liability under Title VII).
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of color, 14 9 women, 150 the poor, 15 1 or a combination of these groups.
152
Few arbitrators tend to be women or people of color, and there have been
some challenges based on this lack of diversity. 153 With these existing
149. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1360-61, 1375-91
(1985).
150. Cherry, supra note 148, at 298-304 (discussing disparate impact on women by
mandatory arbitration policies). See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549 (1991) (showing that mediation "can be
destructive to many women"); see also Carol J. King, Burdening Access To Justice: The Cost
of Divorce Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375 (1999) (asserting concerns
about mediation limiting access to the court system for poor women in divorce proceedings).
151. See Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is it an
Alternative?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 269 (1994) (describing issues with respect to use of ADR for
the poor).
152. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don 't Add Up to Rights: The
Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. I 11, 1114-21 (1996) (asserting that low-income women, particularly of color, do
not fair well in informal processes); see also Stephen Meilli & Tamara Packard, Alternative
Dispute Resolution in a New Health Care System; Will it Work for Everyone?, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 23, 30-35 (1994) (describing problems with ADR for women, minorities, and
the poor). But see Beryl Blaustone, The Conflicts of Diversity, Justice and Peace in the
Theories of Dispute Resolution, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 260-61 n.17 (1994) (arguing that the
theses of Delgado and Grillo are not supported empirically and are limited to anecdotal
support); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender
on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 767,
770 (1996) (finding no empirical studies that show how a disputant's ethnicity or gender
compares in cases decided in court versus mediated cases); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense
of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 467, 468 (1991) (asserting that Grillo's account of mediation
only refers to the abuses of bad mediators without full appreciation of the overall good
mediation experiences).
153. See ADR Taskforce Approves Prototype For Arbitration of Statutory Rights,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at D-14 (May 11, 1995) (listing comments of Due Process
Protocol Taskforce member and former National Academy of Arbitrators' President Arnold
Zack stating that "there is a shortage of women and minorities" to develop a "roster of
qualified arbitrators"); Fairness of Compulsory Arbitration Debated by Lawyers at D. C Bar,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at D-15 (Feb. 21, 1995) (noting comments of Howard Law
Professor and arbitrator, Homer LaRue, that the National Academy of Arbitrators is "mostly
white and male" because only 10% are women and less than I% are people of color); United
States General Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination: How Registered
Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes, (Letter Report, 03/30/94, GAO/HEHS-94-
17), at 2 (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?/Paddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=he94017.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/
gao> (estimating that "most of the NYSE New York arbitrators (about 89% of 726 arbitrators
at the end of 1992) were white men, averaging 60 years of age"); see also Improving
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
disadvantages of mandatory arbitration and a new set of disadvantages on
the horizon, the costs of using mandatory arbitration warrant dismissing it as
a legitimate option for employers.
154
Although there is an interest in employing arbitration to resolve
employment disputes, the use of mandatory arbitration has created too many
significant risks and disadvantages, which have curtailed that interest.
Despite potential human resource benefits and the employer advantage
rhetoric, mandatory arbitration issues have left employers, employees,
government agencies, and various ADR and civil rights organizations
befuddled about how to effectively use arbitration and explore the
opportunities provided by the Gilmer decision. 
155
Diversity in Arbitrator Pool Not Easy, Stock Exchange Officials Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 93, at D-7 (May 14, 1996) (describing difficulty of the stock exchange in filling its
arbitrator pool with minorities and women despite initial criticism in the GAO report). But see
Kenneth May, Participants at SPIDR Gathering Discuss Present and Future of Labor
Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at A-6 (Sept. 29, 1999) (noting comments of
arbitrator, Charles Donegan, that the National Bar Association's Arbitration Section lists 75
black arbitrators as members). This does not mean that the court system is immune from
attacks of being prejudiced. See, e.g., Yael Schacher, Evidence of Bias in the Legal System,
N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1999, at 2 (reviewing comments from a panel of 12 lawyers and judges who
spoke openly and critically about prejudice in the New York legal system). The federal court
system has much better representation but it is having its own difficulties placing federal
judges of color, especially with the current political make-up of Congress. See Debra Baker,
Judicial Nominations, Waiting and Wondering, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 52-53 (discussing
lengthy confirmation battles for President Clinton's minority nominees for federal
judgeships). Approximately 82 out of 825 federal district and circuit court judges are black,
36 Hispanic, seven Asian-Americans, two American-Indian, one Arab-American, and another
124 are white women. Id. at 53.
154. See William W. Fick, Note, Gnawing at Gilmer: Giving Teeth to "Consent" in
Employment Arbitration Agreements: Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc., 1999 WL 80964 (1st Cir. 1999), 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 965 (1999) (arguing that
courts are starting to limit mandatory arbitration despite Gilmer and proposing a strong
consent standard before allowing the arbitration of a statutory employment discrimination
claim); see also Giovagnoli, supra note 25, at 547 (describing recent court challenges and
opposition to mandatory arbitration and suggesting that employers recognize that the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration must be based on fair procedures or litigation will
ensue).
155. See generally Maltby, supra note 74 (describing how the Supreme Court in
Gilner missed the opportunity to expand the use of arbitration to fair situations where both
employees and employers have balanced tools of representation and support to pursue access
and resolution by arbitration). But see Lucille M. Ponte, In the Shadow of Gilmer: How
Post-Gilmer Legal Challenges to Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Point the Way
Towards Greater Fairness in Employment Arbitration, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 359
(1997) (describing how post-Gilmer court decisions have identified some of the fairness
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B. Shooting Blanks To Fix What Isn't Broke: Is There a Big Need for
Mandatory Arbitration When Employers Win Discrimination Cases
Handily In Court?
With the growth of ADR, "policy-makers cannot avoid making
deliberate if fallible choices among alternative ways of processing
disputes."' 156 To assist corporate policy makers in making an informed
decision, a brief review of the litigation option's value in resolving
employment discrimination claims presents a worthwhile exploration.
157
This brief exploration begins with the proviso that any assertion that the use
of ADR or the courts would provide a better means of resolving
employment discrimination disputes is better left to empirical study. 158
Also, the focus of this exploration will show that the litigation system
provides unique advantages for large repeat employers that should not be
dismissed so quickly by pursuing arbitration.
Unfortunately, corporate leaders have shown a tendency to care much
more about large jury verdicts than they should in light of the actual results.
Aside from large jury verdicts, one of the main reasons why corporate
leaders have chosen to increase the use of arbitration, including mandatory
arbitration, is their burning desire to cut legal expenses. 159 This
concerns and pointed the way to continuing fairness in handling employment disputes in
arbitration that Gilmer failed to address).
156. Marc S. Galanter, Introduction: Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of
Dispute Processing, 66(3) DENV. U. L. REV. xi, xi (1989).
157. The use of the terms "litigation," "adjudication," "legal system," or "courts" in
this section are used interchangeably for ease of discussion when referring to the traditional
dispute resolution process employed in the court system although it is probably not accurate
to consider these terms synonymous. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute
Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENY. U. L. REV.
335, 342 n. 17 (1989) (suggesting that the terms should not be used interchangeably because
of differences but recognizing that other scholars have used the terms interchangeably).
158. Although, empirical study and development of such comparatives is "attended by
a host of methodological and conceptual difficulties." Galanter, supra note 156, at xi. Despite
these difficulties, it is incumbent upon scholars and researchers to develop empirical
measurements to compare the quality of one dispute resolution system versus another system,
including a traditional, jury-based litigation system, so that "[i]f our choices (about which
system to employ] are inevitably political, [those choices can be based upon] real alternatives
not imaginary ones." Id. at xiv.
159. See Maltby, supra note 10, at 32 ("The primary motivation of employers for
creating such [arbitration] systems appears to be reducing legal expenses. The Rand Institute
estimated in 1988 that defense costs in wrongful discharge actions averaged over $80,000.");
see also Bickner et al., supra note 27, at 78-79 (finding the number one reason for choosing
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concentration on reducing legal fees at all costs 16 0 and the unnecessary fear
of jury verdicts are what this Article has referred to as a "disconnect"
between corporate leaders and their outside counsel. With a little more
understanding and effort, both groups should realize that they have the
mutual goal of defending employment discrimination lawsuits with high
quality and high results. If this mutual goal is reached by capable outside
counsel, who consistently deliver high quality results for large employers in
the court system and rarely, if ever, have a jury trial, both groups should be
able to develop a connection on how to meet each others' financial
objectives.
1. Enjoying Status Quo: A True Litigation Romanticist's View of the
Results
In some situations, there are legitimate benefits to going to court.
16 1
Professor Stempel has noted that those favoring litigation (rather than ADR)
have been unfairly referred to as "litigation romanticists." 162 While looking
at the issue of the disadvantages for employers in mandatory arbitration, the
arbitration is reducing legal defense costs). But see Trubek et al., supra note 141, at 114-22
(finding that the costs of court litigation are less than many ADR proponents claim).
160. If corporate leaders and their counsel work together, they can find ways to meet
each other's needs as long as they both realize that in some instances you get what you pay
for. See, e.g., The Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics, Business and Ethics Implications of
Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative Billing Arrangements, 54 Bus. LAW. 175,
177 (1998) (citing the "strong desire of business clients that legal costs be not only reasonable
but also predictable" as a major reason for the growing use of alternatives to hourly rate
billing arrangements). Wal-Mart is a key example of a company that has developed a clear
vision on how it wants to handle its litigation goals and has found quality counsel to meet
those goals as part of its corporate family. See Bob Van Voris, Can Controlling Costs
Backfire?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. II, 1999, at B I (describing Wal-Mart's fixed fee billing structure,
defiant litigation strategy, and close, personal relationships with its outside counsel).
161. See generally Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in
Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 807 (1994) (describing a benefit for lawyers and as a
whole for those groups covered by a law to have lawyers proceed with claims through the
court adjudication process). But see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil
Rights Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing how it is difficult to even use the adjudication or litigation system when it is
geared to force parties to settle).
162. Stempel, supra note 1, at 304-05 & n.13 (discussing comments by Professor
Menkel-Meadow referring to the views of Laura Nader and Judith Resnik and citing Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the
MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV.
593, 604 (1994)).
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resulting question, at this stage, was whether court adjudication was a better
option. By choosing to answer that question with a positive, it may foster
notions about being considered a litigation romanticist. However, at least
with respect to the current employment litigation system, large employers
have a great advantage in litigation, and the status quo should be considered
as the best option instead of a rush to mandatory arbitration.
In looking at the status quo legal system, it may not be politically
correct for employers to highlight the significant disadvantages that the
current system creates for employees. However, employers can appreciate
that some of their substantial success in the litigation process has been
highlighted by royal criticism from plaintiffs and employee advocates.
These criticisms highlight key advantages for employers and support the
incentive to maintain the status quo, i.e., employment litigation before the
fascination with mandatory arbitration became acceptable.
For example, certain scholars have questioned the ability of the legal
system to even address the needs and concerns of the disadvantaged
members of our society; those criticisms have existed for many years. 163
Whether plaintiffs' advocates believe that the effectiveness of Title VII is
completely doomed because either victims of discrimination should not
expect the law to right the injustice of institutional discrimination 164 or the
163. See, e.g., JERROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 74 (1976) (claiming that the legal justice system has failed to address the ills of our
society as the author provides excruciating detail of the injustices and cruelties perpetrated by
America's elite lawyers from the 1870s to the 1970s as they ignored the plight of the weak
and the disenfranchised members of our society). In fact, the issue of legal system reform and
the ineffectiveness of the legal system has been challenged as long ago as 1906 when Roscoe
Pound "shocked" the American Bar Association with his complaints about the legal system.
Lesley Oelsner, Unlike 1906, A.B.A. Meeting is Receptive to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
1976, at 30. Those complaints have focused on efforts to limit access to the court system,
which have been described as actions that "could also limit the ability of people to have
important rights vindicated" even if there is some doubt about "the courts' competence or
authority to become a problem solver for society." Id. Several years ago, even then-Harvard
President and long-term Harvard Labor and Employment Law Professor, Derek Bok,
lamented that the American legal system and its attendant costs may be flawed in that "[t]here
is far too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot." Derek
Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38-39.
164. See Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (suggesting
that civil rights leaders should abandon efforts to use the law and the legal system to remedy
the effects of discrimination in our society by coming to the racial realism or acknowledgment
that discrimination has survived and will continue to survive and cause frustration within a
legal system that endorses racism); cf Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of the Law in
Accomplishing Racial Change: School Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L.
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specific statute and its mechanisms have failed, 165 the reasons for failure are
important, because society, not employers, will bear the burden for any
discrimination costs. 166 In fact, an employer has no incentive to address
these costs. 167 If an employer's focus remains on bottom-line economics,
REV. 677 (1997) (explaining that, because of the entrenchment of racism in our society, the
law, albeit an important piece in accomplishing change, cannot transform that racism and may
give the illusion of legal gains without any real reform because real reform only occurs when
the group in power sees some political, economical or other interest in supporting the reform).
Although the argument was made with respect to another milieu, school desegregation, the
arguments made by Professor Douglas are quite persuasive in establishing that the law, in
itself, just cannot accomplish radical change in improving racial issues. Id.; see also DERRICK
A. BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 97-100
(1992) (discussing Professor Bell's belief that racism in our society is too intrinsic and deep-
seated for the courts or laws to eradicate it); CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN
AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL passim (1996) (claiming that growing racial tensions and
injustices in our society along with the lack of success from the legal system may lead to a
race war). However, Professor Cynthia Estlund has persuasively argued that labor and
employment discrimination laws have successfully helped and can continue to help integrate
the workplace, which has now become an important arena for racial discourse and discussion.
See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts
on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49 (1998).
165. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Horizontal Jurisprudence and Sex
Discrimination, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 108, 122-25 (1997) (asserting that Title VII has failed
to cure the problem of gender inequality in the workplace); see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A
Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 374-
76 (1991) (pointing out that court actions under Title VII provide different issues and
concerns for African-American women); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (pointing out the same
criticism). Professor Reginald Robinson has also asserted that the Hobbesian philosophical
foundation of empirical natural law prevents Title VII from eliminating racial discrimination
in employment practices and the philosophical foundation should be shifted to Hegel's ethical
theory. Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law on Title
VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 612 (1993).
166. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Government in Regulating the Workplace, 13
LAB. LAW. I, 3 (1997) (referring to Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer's book,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (Harvard University Press 1982) and finding that "the costs of
leaving the problem uncorrected fall on society rather than on the employer, so the employer
has no direct financial incentive to change"). There are those who believe that discrimination
laws are ineffective because they create a perverse effect on the economy. They have
contended that absent such government intervention sound business judgment and related
economic considerations dictate an employer's actions rather than any basis for employment
discrimination. See, e.g., RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 395-437 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
167. Rabin, supra note 166, at 3.
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the resounding success of the current legal system would be the best option
in many instances for employers, absent the wholesale dismantling of the
discrimination laws. 16
8
Criticisms of the current legal system for handling employment
discrimination disputes tend to focus on providing better results for
plaintiffs, which support the claim that results for employers are excellent.
Many believe the EEOC has failed to make a dent in the war against
employment discrimination. 169 A number of critics have found problems
with the enforcement of Title VII. 170 If Title VII was supposed to provide a
ray of hope for victims of employment discrimination, many commentators
have stated that they believe the statute failed woefully, even with the
extended remedies available under the Act. 171
168. See EPSTEIN, supra note 166 (proposing the elimination of discrimination laws
and a reliance on economic decisionmaking as the prime method for the elimination of
workplace discrimination).
169. See Munroe, supra note 71, at 219 (stating that "race discrimination in
employment remains pervasive despite three decades of government effort" and asserting that
the EEOC has been "constrained to focus on processing individual charges of discrimination"
rather than being able to "concentrate on combatting broader unlawful practices").
170. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, A New Employment Policy for the 1980s: Learning
from the Victories and Defeats of Twenty Years of Title V11, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 895, 905-06
(1985) (finding that a big and unnecessary focus of Title VII jurisprudence between 1979 and
1985 was on procedural issues, including a large number of cases relating to issues on the
statutes of limitations); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329 (1987) (describing how
discrimination laws, including Title VII, refuse to recognize the existence of unconscious
racism); see also Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Twenty
Years Later, II J. INTERGROUP REL. 45, 63-64 (1983) (lamenting the EEOC's inability to
adequately enforce Title VII and its failure to reorganize itself into an enforcement agency
despite its power to do so after the 1972 amendments).
171. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward
a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1455 (1996) (criticizing the
Gilmer decision and the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993), as evidence of growing judicial hostility to civil rights claimants and an
increasing number of cases where courts are granting employers summary judgment in
discrimination cases); Michael J. Yelnosky, Title V11, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 583-97 (1999) (identifying several critiques of Title VII including its
failure to provide a source of success for litigation romanticists); see also Chambliss, supra
note 71, at 41-54 (criticizing the EEOC's systematic role in displacing or denying the pursuit
of conflicts from the. court system and thereby hindering enforcement); Munroe, supra note
71, at 220-21, 275-79 (asserting that the enforcement of Title VII by the EEOC has been so
inept that the administrative requirement of involving the EEOC in these charges should be
dropped); Selmi, supra note 71, at 5-1I, 21-25, 57-64 (reviewing the overall ineffectiveness
of the EEOC and suggesting that it should be disbanded or that its duties and functions should
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Thus, the current legal regime of enforcement and vindication for
employment discrimination has raised a number of concerns for employees
and created a host of advantages for employers, despite the existence of the
extended remedies and jury trial rights provided by the Act. Those
advantages are: problems of proof;172 inability to afford counsel and legal
representation; 173 the requirements of showing intentional discrimination
versus discriminatory impact; 174 and the increasing grant of summary
judgment. 175 They are provided to employees by a judiciary that appears to
be significantly altered); Turner, supra note 71, at 235-40, 285-88 (arguing that Title VII has
failed to meet its goals and aspirations due to its limited enforcement mechanisms).
172. See Linda S. Greene, Equal Employment Opportunity Law Twenty Years After
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Prospects for the Realization of Equality in Employment, 18
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 593, 606-08 (1984) (citing Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and
Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv.
1205, 1280-85 (1981) and making general complaints about the burdens that are placed on
plaintiffs to prove discrimination and the limited burden on the employer to disprove it); see
also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2230-32 (1995) (criticizing the Supreme Court's shifting burden of production
and overall proof requirements for Title VII claims as explained by the Hicks decision);
McGinley, supra note 171 (criticizing burdens of proof under Hicks currently being enforced
by courts reviewing Title VII claims); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1657
(1991) (suggesting that, because Title VII litigation is costly and its scheme of proof makes it
difficult to discover discriminatory motives, employers should be required to hire minorities
in proportion to their percentage in the national population).
173. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990s: The Dichotomy
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 239 (1997) (describing several
disincentives in the law and overall difficulties for plaintiffs' attorneys in undertaking
representation of clients in civil rights litigation and noting from a survey of plaintiffs'
attorneys that the economics involved may make it hard for someone with a good case to find
an attorney if the person does not have the resources to pay a retainer or legal fees).
174. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1245 & n.343 (1995) (agreeing with the proposal of Professor David Oppenheimer in David
P. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993), that the standard
for assessing discrimination under Title VII should be lowered to a negligence standard); see
also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 70 (1972) (arguing that a
disparate impact theory of discrimination that does not require a showing of intentional
discrimination is necessary to prevent employers from perpetuating the "societal"
discrimination of the past); Lawrence, supra note, 170, at 323 (arguing that forms of
unconscious and negative stereotypes also constitute unlawful discrimination).
175. See, e.g., John Parry, American Bar Association Survey on Court Rulings Under
Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act: Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title /
Judicial and Administrative Complaints, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at D-25 (June 22,
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be, at most, hostile to these claims and, at least, concerned that these cases
are a nuisance to the courts' efforts to clear its dockets. 176 Judge Stanley
Sporkin of the D.C. District Court stated, in a recent opinion: "It would be
hoped that at some point Congress would review the law in this area and
make the necessary adjustments to eliminate these meritless, lottery-type
cases." 
17 7
1998) [hereinafter ABA Survey] (describing ABA survey of 1,200 ADA decisions between
1992 and 1997 and finding that employers prevail in almost 92% of the disability
discrimination cases through judicial resolution and 86% through administrative resolution
with the EEOC). See also Disabilities Discrimination: Overwhelming Majority of ADA Job
Suits Fail in Court, ABA Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at D-7 (June 22,
1998) (describing same survey); Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court:
Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 562
(1996) (finding that a survey of federal litigation involving the 2,000 largest U.S.
corporations indicates that large firms are usually "highly successful" in legal proceedings
and "they generally win"); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at
Thirty: Where It's Been, Where it is Today, Where it's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 579, 637-
39 (1997) (reviewing 222 non-appealed federal district court rulings on motions for summary
judgment and motions to dismiss or other dispositive motions involving age discrimination in
1996 and finding 125 of those cases were resolved by a substantive ruling and the defendants
prevailed in 86 (69%) of these rulings); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in
Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,
418-19 (1992) (describing empirical study of defense counsel's belief that summary judgment
proceedings were a key reason for choosing a federal court as the preferred forum to resolve a
dispute).
176. See Shannon P. Duffy, Attorney Rips Into 3rd Circuit for "Disfavoring"
Employment Suits, N.J.L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at 8 (discussing debate where attorney Alice
Ballard confronted U.S. District Court Judges James T. Giles and Donetta Ambrose regarding
their alleged comments that there were "too many" Title VII cases and that they are
"unattractive" cases, respectively, and discussing the judges' denial that they had made those
comments but noting their belief that a number of discrimination cases should have never
been brought); see also Yelnosky, supra note 171, at 593 (discussing various reports and
surveys stating that judges believed that Title VII cases were a waste of time). Indeed, many
employers believe that certain discrimination cases were a waste of time and engendered
"over-litigation" or frivolous lawsuits. See Disabilities Law Viewed Positively But Also As
Cause of Frivolous Suits, 5 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 128 (Aug. 2, 1995)
(asserting that most suits filed under the then-relatively new law of the ADA were frivolous
because of the broad definition of disability and that further definitions, including a good
faith defense, needed to be expanded to protect employers).
177. King v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 9 F. Supp. 2d. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); see also
Turner, supra note 71, at 220 (disagreeing with the perception and earlier comments of
Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin that Title VII cases are "not as important as cases arising under
other federal statutes" and citing Sporkin's views from Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the
Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. REV. 751, 757 (1992)).
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a. Employment Litigation Results
As of August 9, 1999, reports indicated that the EEOC's backlog of
charges had reached 50,000.178 By October 4, 1999, the number of charges
awaiting review dropped to 45,624.179 Although that represents a
remarkable improvement from reports a couple of years ago indicating that
the backlog had reached well more than 100,000,180 it still begs the
question: Does justice delayed mean justice denied? A number of
commentators have answered yes. They have criticized this backlog as part
of an overall belief that the EEOC consists of an overworked and
underfunded agency that cannot deliver justice on behalf of individual
victims of discrimination. 18 1 Notably, these criticisms occurred in 1995, a
time when the charge backlog had reached the ultimate high of 111,000.
In 1995, the EEOC implemented a charge prioritizing process. Three
years later, in June 1998, the EEOC announced that it had nearly cut the
backlog in half by reducing it to 58,000 cases. 182 Professor St. Antoine has
referred to the new charge prioritizing process as a "'triage' procedure...
classifying cases as 'A,' 'B,' or 'C' priorities depending on merit and
importance, and tossing out many charges after the briefest of
investigations."' 183 The EEOC receives approximately 80,000 charges
178. Spelfogel, supra note 92, at B10 (noting that the EEOC backlog was at 50,000).
179. See Jenna Greene, EEOC Whittling Away Backlog, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at
20.
180. Id. (noting that, while 45,624 remains a substantial amount, it is down 6,500
from last year and a "whopping 66,000 less than its high of 111,000 in 1995").
181. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 8-9 (noting
Professor Munroe's belief that the EEOC should get out of the business of processing
charges); see also Munroe, supra note 71, at 275-79 (proposing same); Selmi, supra note 71,
at I I-15 (complaining about the EEOC's backlog).
182. See EEOC Reduces Pending Inventory By Half--to 58,000 cases-n Three
Years, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 157, at A-I (Aug. 14, 1998); EEOC Statistics on Charge
Receipts and Resolutions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 157, at E-6 (Aug. 14, 1998); EEOC
Cuts Charge Inventory to 58,000 Cases, 11 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 251 (Aug.
19, 1998); EEOC Statistics on Charges Through June 1998, 11 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA)
No. 8, at 277 (Aug. 19, 1998).
183. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 8 & n.26. The EEOC also
referred to the process as a "triage" process when it was first developed. See United States
General Accounting Office, EEOC Burgeoning Workload Calls For New Approaches
(Testimony, 05/23/95, GAO/T-HEHS-95-170), at 8 (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?/Paddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=the95170.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/
gao> (elaborating on testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
describing the tremendous growth in the EEOC backlog up to 1995 and the development of
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annually.1 84 The average timeframe to process those charges through the
EEOC's traditional processes takes approximately 268 days, which is down
46 days from last year. 185 Given its progress in improving efficiency, the
EEOC's backlog problems may be less of an issue today than when most of
the backlog criticism started. 186 Still, delays present unique problems for
plaintiffs and employers. Also, to the extent that the new charge processing
system has worked so well, a large number of charges are being
expeditiously dismissed at the administrative level. That provides further
advantages for employers, because it may end the case if the charging party
is unwilling, or unable, to then pursue the matter in court after receiving a
right to sue letter.
Additionally, the overall costs of litigating will either wear down a
plaintiff or prevent the plaintiff from gaining access to the court system to
challenge an employer in the first instance. 187 Thus, the issue for employees
of being coerced into an arbitration forum loses some of its sting in light of
some of the inadequacies of the judicial forum that create advantages for
employers.
The simple truth is that Title VII cases, more often than not, are resolved
via summary judgment granted for the defendant by a district court judge. 188
the priority charge processing plan and its "triage" system as one of a number of responses to
the.increasing backlog),
184. See Montwieler, supra note 119, at C- 1.
185. See Greene, supra note 179, at 20.
186. Although, some state administrative agencies also have enormous problems
processing charges. See Mark Hamblett, State Agency Must Clear Backlog; Housing, Job
Bias Claims Take Seven Years, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1999, at I (discussing court order requiring
that the New York State Division of Human Rights take several drastic measures to remove
its tremendous backlog where a charge typically takes seven years to resolve and out of
43,327 charges from 1990 to 1998, 34% had taken more than three years to resolve and out of
3,947 probable cause determinations, 75% were unresolved after three years, 50% after five
years, 28% after 7 years, and 14% after nine years).
187. See, e.g., James W. Meeker & John Dombrink, Access to the Civil Courts for
Those of Low and Moderate Means, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2217, 2218 (1993) (reviewing
surveys noting that access to courts is limited because many cannot afford the costs of
litigation); see also Sabatino, supra note 104, at 1291 (suggesting that parties are increasingly
"unable or unwilling to bear the excesses of our elaborate civil justice system"); Turner, supra
note 25, at 283 & n.400 (noting that the problem of access to the court system is particularly
difficult for employment discrimination claimants).
188. See, e.g., Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d
1004, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that 26 Title VII cases in 1996 reached the court by
this posture and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court 21 out of 26 times).
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More than 90 percent of employment cases are resolved before trial. 189
"Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment
discrimination is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry
tree."'190 Claims of unlawful discrimination may be based on disparate
treatment, where proof of discriminatory intent is the nature of the claim, or
based on the disparate impact theory, when the claim involves a facially
neutral employment policy alleged to disproportionately or adversely affect
a protected group. In a disparate treatment case, the ultimate burden is on
the employee to prove that he or she was the victim of intentional
discrimination. 19 1 It is possible for an employee to present direct evidence
of the employer's discriminatory intent, but it is unlikely, save for that
handful of cases where the employer was momentarily imprudent and, for
example, uttered some pejorative remark or admitted in writing that the
person's protected status was the reason for the decision in question. 
192
Therefore, Title VII plaintiffs have been forced to rely on the indirect
shifting burdens of production to establish a case of intentional
discrimination by circumstantial evidence, as set forth by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 193 Under this method, the employee
has the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.
In a termination setting, the plaintiff typically must establish that: (1) the
employee is a member of a protected group under Title VII; (2) the
employee was qualified for his or her employment position; (3) the
employee was terminated; and (4) the position remained open and was
ultimately filled by someone not in the protected group. 194 Establishment of
this prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee. 195 The burden of production shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment decision; by articulating such reason, the employer rebuts the
189. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997).
190. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir.
1985).
191. See, e.g., Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie
Case for the Prima Facie Case, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 377-78 (1997) (lamenting the difficulties
for employers and employees in addressing summary judgment under the established burden
shifting analysis).
192. See, e.g., Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 638 ("Employers are rarely so cooperative as
to include a notation in the personnel file, 'fired due to age."').
193. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
194. Id. at 802.
195. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (198 1).
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presumption of discrimination created by the employee's prima facie case.
The employee must, then, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
the reason offered by the employer is not the true reason for its employment
decision and (2) the reason offered was merely a pretext for
discrimination. 
196
This burden shifting process and overall alignment of proof has created
a well-established and successful process for employers to consistently
obtain summary judgment, at a rate as high as ninety-two percent in some
instances and depending upon the type of claim involved for cases decided
through 1997.197
b. Comparison with Employment Arbitration Results
What little empirical evidence that does exist demonstrates that
employers will not win similar cases on the same level and frequency in
arbitration as they do in the courts. Lewis Maltby compared data between
arbitration and litigation results as follows:
Comparisons of the result rates in arbitration versus litigation reveal that,
contrary to what many would expect, employees prevail more often in
arbitration than in court. For example, an AAA survey of employment
arbitration results from 1993-95 shows that employees who arbitrated their
claims won sixty-three percent of the time. In comparison, according to
federal district court records for 1994, only 14.9% of the employees who
took their claims to court won their cases. 198
Maltby's review also discovered, unsurprisingly, that a large number of
discrimination cases never reach a jury. In 1994, of the 3,419 employment
discrimination cases in which the federal courts made a definitive judgment,
Maltby noted that sixty percent were disposed of by pre-trial motion and that
employers won virtually all of these decisions (ninety-eight percent). 199
196. Id. at 256.
197. See ABA Survey, supra note 175 (finding employers prevail in almost 92% of
the disability discrimination cases through judicial resolution, and 86% through
administrative resolution with the EEOC); Eglit, supra note 175, at 637-39 (reviewing 222
non-appealed federal district court rulings on motions for summary judgment and motions to
dismiss or other dispositive motions involving age discrimination in 1996 and finding 125 of
those cases were resolved by a substantive ruling and defendants prevailed in 86 of these
rulings, i.e., 69%).
198. Maltby, supra note 10, at 46 (citations omitted).
199. See id. at 47 (citations omitted).
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Using the same data sets, Maltby compared the mean damages awarded in
arbitration and litigation as a percentage of the damages demanded. 200 For
arbitration, the mean damages added up to approximately twenty-five
percent of the amount demanded. The mean damages in court added up to
seventy percent of the amount demanded, which suggests that plaintiffs do
not win in court often and that if they do they will likely receive much closer
to what they demanded than they will in arbitration. 201 Maltby, then,
calculated an "adjusted outcome" as a percentage of demands for all
participants in arbitration and the courts, not just those who were successful.
This adjusted outcome resulted in eighteen percent for arbitration and a little
more than ten percent for litigation, which means that as a whole employees
tend to prevail on their demands with much greater frequency in arbitration
than they do in litigation. 202 Overall, the Maltby results refute the employer
advantage rhetoric by showing how employees will do better in arbitration
versus the courts and employers will do worse in terms of outcomes. 203
Accordingly, with results favoring employers in litigation, mandatory
arbitration fails as a worthwhile option.
2. A Disconnect Between Corporate Leaders & Their Counsel:
Fearing Jury Verdicts and Attorneys' Fees
a. Much Ado Than Should Be Due About Jury Verdicts
Many corporate leaders have pointed to the use of ADR as a panacea.204
These leaders appear to have developed what Professor Judith Resnik has
called a "failing faith in adjudication." 205 Concerns about often-publicized,
200. See id. at 48-49.
201. See id. at 48.
202. See id.
203. See also Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The
Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment--A Proposed
Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1517, 1565 (1999) (demonstrating how arbitrators tend to
split the difference or give the claimant something in arbitration, by finding, in a review of
316 arbitration decisions involving alleged sexual harassers, who challenged disciplinary
action against them in arbitration, that "almost half of all discipline issued for sexual
harassment (or conduct which could constitute sexual harassment under Title VII standards) is
altered by the arbitrator" to a lesser penalty or no penalty).
204. See Lande, supra note 21, at 61 & nn. 177-78; Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 20, at
138-41.
205. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 21, at 529-30.
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but rarely-occurring large jury verdicts have also driven this failing faith.
206
Large punitive damage awards should be a concern, especially when "the
top ten verdicts awarded in the United States totaled $2.8 billion, up 375
percent over the top ten verdicts of 1997, according to Lawyers Weekly
USA. ' 207 Neither companies nor their outside counsel want a large jury
verdict against them.
20 8
However, the concern about juries has become a pervasive and
misunderstood issue among employers. 209 Is this concern about juries really
well-placed or is it much ado than should be due given the limited number
of matters that get decided by juries?2 10 When compensatory damages and
206. See Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and
Economic Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 237, 277 (1998) (analyzing the effect that the media
has on our perceptions of punitive damages by finding that, although punitive damages occur
in only 4.6% of verdicts, they occur in 21.3% of all reports of verdicts). Gerber also found
that, because of the media emphasis, "company decisionmakers are likely to substantially
overestimate the frequency and magnitudes of punitive damages awards." Id. at 250.
207. David Segal, Tag-Team Lawyers Make Businesses Blink; HMOs Latest to
Grapple With Threat ofinvestor-Scaring Mega- Verdicts, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1999, at Al.
208. Id. (noting a new trend in plaintiffs firms of joining together across the country to
pool resources that helps force settlement with large companies because the stock market
responds to suits from powerful plaintiffs' firms by lowering stock and "[e]very CEO fears
the random billion-dollar verdict and the wrath of stockholders that could bring" so "when
companies settle, even if it isn't on the merits, the stock will rise."). See generally John H.
Mason & Christopher L. Ekman, Defending Against Damages Claims in Discrimination
Cases, 13 LAB. LAW. 471 (1998) (describing the hopes of most employers that they do not
have to address the issue of damages and a jury verdict in an employment discrimination
trial).
209. See, e.g., Greg Guidry & Gerald Huffman, Jr., Legal and Practical Aspects of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Non-Union Companies, 6 LAB. LAW. 1, 3 (1990)
(discussing the problems employers have faced when employees bring lawsuits before juries);
see also Willam B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for
Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404, 405 (1987) ("The cost of lawsuits that respond to a
discharge, as measured by jury awards and settlements, has also increased geometrically and
is beginning to draw concern from the business community."); Francis A. Spina, Jury
Selection in Employment Discrimination Cases, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1994, at 25-26
(asserting that employers come to bat with two strikes against them due to the glee with which
plaintiffs' attorneys welcomed the jury trial right granted by the Act in 1991 ).
210. See Sabatino, supra note 104, at 1342 & n.222 (citing Marc S. Galanter & Mia
Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (referring to statistics reflecting that 85% to 95% of civil cases do
not go to trial and stating, "One must remember that about ninety percent of all civil cases are
resolved without a trial, mainly in settlement.")). But see Harvey Berkman, Want Big Bucks?
Try With a Jury, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1999, at AI (reviewing a recent Department of Justice
survey of nearly 16,000 tort, contract, and property cases tried in state courts of the nation's
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punitive damages first became available under the Act, at least one
commentator asserted that employers should fear increasing litigation and
large jury verdicts in Title VII cases.2 1 The fear of subjecting employers to
a litigation "lottery" was also one of the key reasons why certain groups
vigorously challenged the 1990 version of the Act.2 12 If employees really
choose to litigate because of legal and punitive damages and the right to a
jury trial, then those extended remedies may warrant concern from
employers. 2 13 However, a study of jury trials in race discrimination claims
decided pursuant to section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866214
75 largest counties showing that in 1992, plaintiffs won only 51.7% of civil jury trials and
that number had decreased to only 48.7% by 1996, including a decline in all categories of tort
suits, as well as in employment discrimination cases). Specifically, for employment
discrimination cases, the success rate for plaintiffs fell from 56. 1% to 47.6%. Id. Although the
overall median award for damages dropped during that time, the median "almost doubled in
cases of employment discrimination, from $141,000 to $250,000" and the "portion of
employment-related awards over $250,000 also rose, from 40% to 48%." Id. In employment
discrimination cases plaintiffs have a "substantially better shot at victory before a jury than a
judge: Juries in 1996 found for the employee-plaintiff almost half the time, while judges did
so in just a quarter of cases." Id. In those employment cases, juries awarded a median of
$250,000 and gave more than $1 million in one out of seven cases but judges, in contrast,
awarded a median of only $75,000 and gave no verdicts of more than $1 million. Id.
211. See Loudon, supra note 29, at 321-22 (despairing about the expected growth in
damage claims and jury trials because of the Act); see also Costs of Litigation, Gilmer
Decision Encourages Alternative Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at A-8
(Dec. 18, 1991) (recounting statements of certain employers suggesting a growing interest in
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms after passage of the Act); Susan Schenkel-Savitt,
New and Improved Remedies for Intentional Discrimination and the Expanded Reach of Title
VII and the Disabilities Acts, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, at 217, 224-25 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 429 (1992)) (predicting that the Act's "[p]unitive and compensatory damages will
increase the amount of monies won in . . . successful employment discrimination cases" and
also "dramatically" increase the effect of the ADA which extended "civil rights protection to
43 million Americans who are disabled").
212. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125 n.5 (1992) (referring to a
statement by Victor Schachter made during the debate of the 1990 version of the Act).
213. To the extent that there is empirical information, it suggests that employees
choose to litigate because they want their side or "voice" to be heard by an impartial party and
the typical employee who files suits is non-white, likely to be young, and apt to file a great
number of grievances. See Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Who Files Suits and
Why: An Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 118-19, 138-
39, 143 (1981).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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demonstrates that few cases get to juries and that overall huge damage
awards happen too infrequently to consider them an overriding concern.215
In 1998, the EEOC made large recoveries in a few-high profile cases,
including a $34 million settlement in a sexual harassment class action
against Mitsubishi Motor Corporation's American subsidiary and a $183
million age discrimination settlement against Lockheed Martin, predecessor
of Martin Marietta.2 16 In addition, the even more publicized race
discrimination case involving Texaco and alleged tape recordings
identifying racial and religious slurs that occurred in 1996 and led to a
landmark $176 million dollar private settlement with the plaintiffs has added
to the concern about unpredictable jury verdicts.2 17 Adding to this fear is the
further recovery of more than $268 million through enforcement and
litigation in 1999, including $25 million in a class action pregnancy
discrimination suit against Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell Telephone, an $8
million settlement in a sexual and racial harassment class action against
Ford Motor Company, and a $28 million age discrimination class settlement
215. See WENDY S. WHITE ET AL., ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE AWARDS UNDER SECTION
1981 (1990) (describing a review of 576 § 1981 race discrimination cases and finding that
144 settled or were reversed or remanded, 314 of the cases were dismissed before trial or a
court or jury ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief, and out of the 118 remaining
cases where the plaintiff proved that discrimination had occurred, in 50 of these cases
plaintiffs did not receive any compensatory relief or punitive damages despite their
availability in § 1981 cases).
216. See Greene, supra note 179, at 20 (discussing the EEOC's "high-profile"
victories in 1998 involving Mitsubishi and Lockheed Martin).
217. See Charles M. Foster et al., Compliance Programs: An Alternative to Punitive
Damages for Corporate Defendants, 49 S.C. L. REV. 247, 266 n.153 (1998) (noting that the
fear of liability for punitive damages under the Act "likely sparked [Texaco's] willingness to
enter into such a large settlement"); see also Ameritech, EEOC Reach $1 Million Accord Over
Midwest Workforce Resizing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 163, at A-3 (Aug. 24, 1998)
(describing settlement entered in federal court with 40 former Ameritech employees who will
divide $1 million in agreed resolution of age discrimination claims in a suit filed by the
EEOC); Benjamin A. Holden, Ex-Employees at GM's Hughes Unit Win $89.5 Million in
Race-Bias Suit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1994, at B4 (describing large punitive damage awards
given to two individual plaintiffs totaling $80 million out of total award of $89.5 million for
race discrimination claims); Thomas Scheffey, Federal Caps Runneth Over in $600,000
Pregnancy Firing, The CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1999, at I (describing a jury award of
$600,000 (more than $300,000 allowed by the damage caps for the plaintiffs employer with
over 500 employees) granted to a former $7-an-hour employee who worked at a mall after
finding evidence of pregnancy discrimination). See, e.g., Timm v. Progresssive Steel
Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that award of $15,000 in punitive
damages was appropriate even though the jury found that no compensatory damages were
warranted).
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involving insurance brokerage company Johnson and Higgins, now a part of
Marsh & McLennan. 2 18 These highly-publicized but rarely-occurring cases
contribute to paranoia about juries.
Conventional wisdom holds that juries sympathize more with discharged
employees than do judges and consequently will find for employees more
frequently and award higher damages.2 19 However, Professor Martha West
has asserted that "[e]mployment is one area of modem life where the
public's perception of presumed rights does not correspond to the legal
system's refusal to recognize such rights" demonstrates that juries adapt to
the "economic realities" involved.220 In Professor West's opinion, these
''economic realities" tend to place employers and employees on a level
playing field when addressing discharge questions.
22 1
A classic example of unnecessary fear of jury verdicts started in
wrongful discharge cases in the 1980s. Although it is understood that jury
verdicts may be "unpredictable and erratic, producing different outcomes on
similar facts,"'2 22 the public perception inspired by the media that employees
get very large jury verdicts for wrongful discharge was another overly
publicized matter based on situations that rarely occur.
223
In a study of 223 California wrongful discharge cases between January
1979 and May 1987, researchers found that a more accurate report of awards
would be that "[m]ore than half the plaintiffs in litigated wrongful discharge
cases lost outright, and among those who won, half won less that $135,000,"
although "the average award when plaintiffs won exceeded $450,000."
'224
Again, Professor West's view of this information is that it suggests the
prospect of large compensatory and punitive damage awards may have
served to deter employers from arbitrarily using their power to discharge
218. Greene, supra note 179, at 20.
219. Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 48 n.235 (1988).
220. Id. at 48.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 49.
223. David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, Life After Foley: The Bottom Line, 5 LAB.
LAW. 667, 668 (1989) ("[W]e concluded that selective reports of landmark verdicts,
haphazardly reported surveys, and anecdotal evidence had combined to present a misleading
picture of wrongful discharge litigation."); see also Cooper, supra note 25, at 239
("Management is well protected by law, by jury instructions, and by juror attitudes that are
more conservative than commonly believed. The average employment discrimination
claimant loses.").
224. Jung & Harkness, supra note 223, at 669 (referring to original study made by
Jung & Harkness reprinted in 4 LAB. LAW. 257 (1988)).
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employees rather than placing an onerous burden on employers to make
frequent payouts and provide financial windfalls to their employees.
225
Nevertheless, the threat of punitive damages has exacerbated the
concern of employers regarding large jury verdicts.226 Yet, in some
instances, the threat of punitive damages may be more about imagination
than reality.227 Even most large punitive damage awards are overturned on
appeal. 228 Whether there is truly a litigation explosion or it is truly a
hyperbolic construct to benefit those who want court and tort reform, there
is little information to support the incessant corporate fear of jury verdicts
and large punitive damage awards. 229 Recent indications strongly suggest
that there might be little to support the punitive damages scare other than
partisan politics.
230
225. West, supra note 219, at 46.
226. Jung & Harkness, supra note 223, at 669 (noting that, if punitive damage awards
were eliminated in wrongful discharge suits, "the average award in wrongful discharge cases
would have dropped by over half').
227. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Tort Lawyers Give Up Punies, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20,
1999, at A I (reviewing a significant trend where plaintiffs are willing to trade big punitive
awards in exchange for a corporate defendant's promise to make changes that prevent future
injuries as evidenced by a proposal of plaintiffs' lawyer Brian Panish to forego most of the
punitive damages his client had won in a suit against General Motors in exchange for
preventative action).
228. Id.
229. See Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3,
27 (1986) (noting a general but benign increase in filings and finding that "[i]n federal, as in
state courts, most cases settle."); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don 't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61-63 (1983) (challenging the existence of a litigation
explosion); see also Selmi, supra note 71, at 40-42 (reviewing a study of tort awards and
finding that chances of a large verdict in employment discrimination cases before a judge was
a virtual nullity with only 22% success but it could be nearly double that amount or 42%
success for a plaintiff if a jury is involved). But see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (alleging the
existence of a litigation explosion and arguing for court reform). Surprisingly, since
Republicans took over the majority in Congress in 1994, there has been very little federal
court or tort reform legislation passed to address the alleged litigation explosion; apparently,
that is because President Clinton, with the threat of veto, has been able to keep most reform
efforts at some middle ground. See Harvey Berkman, After the Hype, Tort Reform Moves
Slowly, NAT'L L.J., June 14, 1999, at AI (noting comments of President Clinton's Deputy
White House Counsel, Bruce R. Lindsey: "We've tried to take a middle position between the
Republicans who would like to make major changes in our tort system and consumer groups
who basically think our current tort system isn't broken and therefore doesn't need fixing.").
230. See Marc S. Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 741, 751 (1998) (citing Herbert M. Kritzer &
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b. Build Trust, Not Fees
In some instances, the current corporate decisionmaking process
regarding legal fees, while having a worthy end of reducing costs, has
escalated into a focus on cutting legal expenses so much that there is a
disregard of the results.23 1 Despite the large percentage of employers that do
not use arbitration, some employer proponents of mandatory arbitration
exist.232 These proponents of mandatory arbitration claim that they have
saved large amounts of money in using arbitration. 23
3 ,
By choosing to arbitrate rather than litigate, corporate leaders and their
outside employment counsel have failed to connect regarding the value of
using the court system to resolve employment discrimination cases.
2 34 At
least one of the reasons for this disconnect may arise from the handling of
the discovery process. Employers may be surprised by the costs of paying
their own counsel, who will drag out the process to force plaintiffs with
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort to Bring it into
View, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 157 (1998) and noting unsuccessful efforts to have all the key
players, including those interested in tort reform get together to study punitive damages, but
being sandbagged at the last minute by tort reformists and corporate leaders who apparently
"took their marching orders from corporate operatives" and were merely seeking an "arena for
[their own] partisan advocacy").
231. Two commentators have noted, "The problem with such thinking is that" you
cannot "fixate on the amount of legal fees paid, while giving insufficient consideration to
whether total legal costs are really reduced when one factors into the analysis not only legal
fees, but also judgments and settlements." See Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, Does a
Good Result Beat a Cheap Legal Fee?, 69 FLA. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 44 (describing how an
effort to cut legal fees without focusing on the bottom-line costs of results and judgments had
led USF&G company to realize that, while it had reduced its legal fees over time by using
small firms that charged nearly $100 per hour less than the big firms it had been using, these
lawyers tended to negotiate more settlements, which had led USF&G to develop a reputation
as an "easy mark" in insurance defense cases).
232. Brennan, supra note 18, at Al (referring to survey finding that only 25% of
litigators and 9% of the in-house counsel preferred using arbitration).
233. Id. (noting the comments of Clifford Whitehill, vice-president and general
counsel of Darden Restaurants in Orlando, Florida, who asserted "that his company has saved
nearly $5 million by using ADR, primarily arbitration in employment cases"). Although Mr.
Whitehill made this comment, there was no explanation or support for how he reached this
conclusion and nothing to determine whether the savings were based on a decrease in
attorneys' fees without comparing the amount and quantity of awards issued in arbitration
versus awards in the court system to determine a bottom-line savings.
234. The most likely reasons are that corporate leaders have many bad personal
experiences with litigation and the media exacerbates the problems with the legal system so
that the average member of society has negative views of lawyering and the litigation process.
See Lande, supra note 2 1, at 3-7, 5 1-52.
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limited resources to settle when they still have to pay plaintiffs some amount
as part of the settlement. Outside counsel should invest the time and effort to
work with in-house counsel and corporate leaders to understand these
discovery dynamics. With joint efforts, corporate leaders and their counsel
may realize the benefits of paying outside counsel fees and a settlement
amount to a plaintiff after a lengthy discovery battle. As an example, an
employer may spend $35,000 in legal fees to outside legal counsel to handle
the case through extended and contentious discovery while eventually
settling a case for $15,000. Instead of reacting negatively to having to pay
$35,000 in legal fees and having to pay the plaintiff $15,000 too, the
employer may have saved itself from having to pay a larger amount of
possibly $90,000, plus $50,000 in attorneys' fees, if the case had quickly
gone to trial or to an arbitrator.
Another reason for the disconnect is that corporate leaders can always
point to some anecdotal situation where they believed they were involved in
a frivolous case. Then, the administrative agency and the courts
unnecessarily prolonged the matter, which made the company incur
significant attorneys' fees235 despite the ultimate resolution in its favor.236
As established above, these few anecdotal situations pale in comparison to
the results favoring employers in courts.237
Other issues related to the disconnect between employers and their
outside counsel may be based on a failure of outside counsel to become key
quality and trusting business partners with their corporate clients as part of a
customer-supplier relationship. 238 In the 1980s, company leaders became
235. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyers' Fees and the Holy Grail: Where Should Clients
Search For Value?, 77 JUDICATURE 187 (1994) (suggesting that clients explore creative
mechanisms for improving relationships with lawyers and payment of legal fees).
236. See Lande, supra note 21, at 51-52 (noting that most corporate leaders surveyed
had negative personal experiences with the court system).
237. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 215 (describing a review of 576 § 1981 race
discrimination cases and finding that 144 settled, were reversed or were remanded, 314 of the
cases were dismissed before trial or a court or jury ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to
relief, and out of the I 18 remaining cases where the plaintiff proved that discrimination had
occurred, in 50 of these cases plaintiffs did not receive any compensatory relief or punitive
damages despite their availability in § 1981 cases); Eglit, supra note 175, at 645-50 (finding
that employers prevailed in 71 out of 94 cases published in 1996 and defendants who won
below were able to preserve their victories 70% of the time and plaintiffs who won below
were only able to preserve their victory on appeal 57% of the time); see also Dunworth &
Rogers, supra note 175, at 562 (noting that large firms are usually "highly successful" in legal
proceedings and "they generally win").
238. See, e.g., Michael B. Kinnard, What Companies Want from Law Firms: Quality,
Service, Responsibility-The Relationship of Corporation to Outside Counsel is Becoming
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driven to improve their profits and overall financial standing on a global
basis. 239 Litigation costs and payment of attorneys fees in the United States
represented key areas for companies to improve their financial position
when competing with companies in other countries. 240 But with most
multinational corporations, who have a substantial amount of business in the
United States, the emphasis on improved relationships and mutual gains for
corporate leaders and their counsels will remove this disconnect about the
value of the current employment litigation system for employers.
If corporate leaders develop cooperative relationships of trust 24 1 and use
non-binding ADR mechanisms like mediation 242 without the attendant
problems and costs associated with mandatory arbitration, employers and
their counsel should be able to reconnect and make an informed decision
about ADR versus the court system as a resolution to an employment
discrimination dispute.243 But given the overwhelming success for
employers in the court system and absent some empirical data showing a big
bottom-line cost savings from employing arbitration instead of the courts, if
it is not broken, why use mandatory arbitration to fix it?
One that Will be Fueled by Innovation and Technology, 63 DEF. CoUNs. J. 387, 387-88
(1996) (noting the necessity to build customer-supplier relationships between companies and
their counsel that will foster true partnerships); see also Martin A. Frey, Representing Clients
Effectively in an ADR Environment, 33 TULSA L.J. 443, 444 (1997) (suggesting that litigation
attorneys develop a better understanding of ADR to assist clients in making informed choices
or else they risk losing those clients).
239. Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 20, at 141-42.
240. But see Trubek et al., supra note 141, at 109 (concluding from an empirical study
of civil litigation cases that litigation "pays" for the parties who engage in it as a whole,
including defendants).
241. See, e.g., Zoe Baird, A Client's Experience with Implementing Value Billing, 77
JUDICATURE 198, 198-200 (1994) (discussing the implementation of a billing system where
payment is linked to performance and how working together with outside counsel provided a
positive and synergistic relationship).
242. Brennan, supra note 18, at A l (referring to a survey finding that 69% of litigators
and 88% of in-house counsel prefer non-binding mediation and 88% of in-house counsel and
80% of litigators believed that mediation was quick and cost-effective).
243. See Lande, supra note 21, at 60-65 (proposing the development of private ADR
as a mechanism to improve perceptions of corporate leaders and their counsel's faith in
litigation).
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IV. RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS WITH MANDATORY
ARBITRATION FOR SMALL EMPLOYERS
The EEOC has issued a statement that intends to focus on building
relationships with small 244  and mid-sized businesses. 245  Current
chairwoman of the EEOC, Ida L. Castro, launched this effort at her first
meeting after taking over leadership of the EEOC in December 1998.246 At
that EEOC meeting, panelists from the Society for Human Resource
Management, the National Employment Council, and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (as representatives of certain small and mid-sized business
interests) noted positive accomplishments by the EEOC. Some of those
accomplishments included the EEOC's ongoing enforcement reforms, which
have reduced the required time to process charges, its technical assistance
seminars focusing on the needs of small businesses, and its newer and
simplified policy guidances.247 However, the panel also addressed ongoing
concerns of small business with respect to dealing with the EEOC. Those
concerns included long delays in processing a discrimination charge,
investigators who lack objectivity, and the need for education about the
benefits of mediation versus the EEOC's traditional investigation
process.
2 4 8
Another legitimate concern that small businesses should address with
the EEOC in the next millennium is the issue of mandatory arbitration. A
244. Small employers are already treated differently under the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, which requires federal agencies to provide
additional services to small businesses to help them understand laws and to assist them with
compliance. Pub. L. No. 105-135, 111 Stat. 2592 (1994) (codified throughout the code). A
key requirement to be considered a small business is to have "annual receipts not in excess of
$500,000." 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1) (1994 & Supp.). The EEOC, the Department of Labor, and
the Small Business Administration have devoted specific parts of their Internet web sites to
small businesses. See EEOC, Small Business Information (last modified Mar. 22, 1999)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/small>; U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Small Business Plans (last
modified Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/osbp>; Small Business Administration,
Small Business Home Page (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.sba.gov>, respectively. Also,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 limited compensatory and punitive damages by employer size.
See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (1999) (placing caps on recovery of $30,000 for employers with
less than 101 employees and up to a maximum of $500,000 for employers with more than 500
employees).
245. See EEOC, EEOC Focuses on Relationship with Small and Mid-Sized Businesses





General Accounting Office ("GAO") study showed that the percentage use
of arbitration was actually highest with the smallest employers. 249 Because
they tend to be "one-shotters" that do not have the resources to truly gain
from the legal system like larger advantaged "repeat players," smaller
employers may find some interest in mandatory arbitration. 250 If you look at
the issue of mandatory arbitration for small employers from solely a
standpoint of results, there is not much benefit. Small employers do not
possess a repeat player advantage in arbitration. The empirical data shows
that small employers are much more likely to lose to employees than large
employers. 25 1 However, the peace of mind, certainty, and lack of an
ongoing mental drain on its supervisors and human resource personnel, if a
quick resolution can be obtained, may provide non-economic advantages
regardless of the long-term costs and poorer outcomes.
The bargaining and results that develop in the shadow of the law and the
courts have strongly contributed to the overwhelming success of large
employers in litigation. 252 Professor Galanter predicted that, when the
249. GAO Report, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that 10.2% of businesses with 100 to 499
employees used arbitration versus 7.5% for businesses with 500 to 999 employees and 9.5%
for businesses with 1,000 or more employees). Although not a statistically significant
difference, the use of arbitration by smaller businesses at similar percentages or higher than
the percentages of larger businesses shows that arbitration has a strong interest with small
employers.
250. Galanter, supra note 3, at 97-104.
251. See Bingham, supra note 25, at 234. Professor Bingham found that, when one-
shot employees face arbitration with one-shot employers, the employees win more than 70%
of the time, but when one-time player employees face arbitration with repeat-player
employers, the employees win only about 16% of the time. Id. In cases involving one-time-
player employers, employees recover an average of 48% of what they demand as opposed to
only recovering 11% of what they demand with repeat-player employers. Id. Shortly after
Professor Bingham made her findings, the ABA Journal asked her to review the data and
Richard Reuban commented:
In figures separately computed for the ABA Journal, Professor Bingham looked at
the 232 claims brought by employees [at the AAA in 1993] and found that the odds
are 5-to-I against the employee in a repeat-player case, while the odds are 2.4-to-I in
favor of the employee in non repeat-player cases.
Reuben, supra note 80, at 61.
252. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing how the realities of the law cast a
shadow over the outcomes and choices that opponents may have when negotiating a
resolution to their dispute); see also Rachel H. Yarkon, Note, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Lawyers: Negotiated Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from
Termination of Employment, 2 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 165, 165 n.3 (1997) (explaining
that bargaining in the shadow of the law refers to an understanding of "how rules and
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litigation ebbs along at a snail's pace, as it does now either through the
EEOC or the courts, the powerful will be able to prevail. 253 In contrast,
small employers, as one-shotters, want a fast decision regardless of the
outcome. The horrendous costs and delays in the court system would cause a
small employer great expense to obtain legal counsel who has the skills and
repeat knowledge to navigate the litigation process. The risk-averse, small
employer does not have the huge coffers to wait out a long, drawn-out piece
of litigation or the flexibility to drum up a large fund to pay defense
attorneys while the matter is ongoing.254 These small employers tend to
operate on fairly equal bargaining terms with their employees. Those
employees also maintain a closely vested interest in seeing that their
employer does not have to go out of business due to litigation costs. They
need their employer to continue operating so they can continue to collect a
paycheck.
Professor Galanter predicted that like kinds (repeat players with repeat
players and one-shotters with one-shotters) would be less likely to use the
court system and more likely to employ the benefits of privatized
systems.2 5 5 Lawsuits against start-up and emerging companies in high-tech
industries where competition is at a premium can result in an "economic hit"
that "could be devastating." 2 56 Although these "start-ups have the same
obligations as corporations," they are usually more "vulnerable to lawsuits
procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs
between [parties] outside the courtroom" and then rejecting this theory as too unpredictable as
an incentive to why plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases decide to settle).
253. Galanter, supra note 3, at 119-22.
254. See Yarkon, supra note 252, at 189-90 nn. 119 & 123 (noting that smaller
employers are risk-averse in comparison to large companies and that a pending lawsuit would
not interrupt the economic stream of a large employer but small and mid-sized businesses
"don't have the same degree of discretionary funds as a large company").
255. Galanter, supra note 3, at 124-26 (referring to dispute resolution as "Alternatives
To The Official System"); see id. at 108 (describing how most one-shotter versus one-shotter
disputes are "pseudo-litigation" where the parties have worked out a settlement that is ratified
in the guise of adjudication or that it involves fights with overtones of "spite" and
"irrationality" and it involves few appeals); see also id. at 144 (finding that private dispute
resolution will be preferred when both parties are repeat players).
256. Tatiana Boncompagni, Labor Practices Boom with Economy, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
8, 1999, at I (noting that new high-tech companies' growth and recent Supreme Court
decisions requiring the development of certain anti-discrimination policies to prevent liability
has created a large increase in labor and employment law staffing at both plaintiff-side and
management-side firms in the metropolitan D.C. area and nationwide).
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because 'they don't have in place the proper mechanisms to ensure that
hiring and firing isn't discriminatory.'-
257
In light of uncertain litigation about the legality of mandatory arbitration
agreements, 258 a cautious approach to the use of mandatory arbitration is
required. This understandable response constitutes an unfortunate result for
small employers that need quick and flexible alternatives to unpredictable
litigation. Given the general benefits that arbitration may provide
employees259 and the overall peace of mind and short-term flexibility that it
could provide if a dispute is resolved quickly, small employers may still
crave mandatory arbitration with their employees. 260 A marginal increase in
a small employer's bottom-line costs from defending litigation could make
the overall advantage of litigation subject to diminishing returns. Because of
this volatile economic existence, these small employers would likely still be
willing to use arbitration despite exposing themselves to all the
257. Id. (quoting Debra Katz, an attorney for a plaintiffs' boutique firm).
258. See supra discussion in Part lI.B.
259. See Maltby, supra note 10, at 45-56 (describing the comparative outcomes in
arbitration for employees).
260. By highlighting the unique problems for small employers, this Article is only
suggesting that small employers may find reasons outside of overall costs and outcomes to
choose mandatory arbitration. Concerns about enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements would still present a problem for even small employers and it would be very
difficult for the courts to make distinctions between small employers and larger employers.
More precisely, a court would likely have the difficult task of focusing on the relative
bargaining power of the employee versus the small employer and deciding enforcement of the
agreement based upon general fairness and the totality of the circumstances. Cf Torrez v.
Public Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1991). In Torrez, the majority reviewed the
following factors to determine if an age discrimination waiver was valid:
(1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; (2) the plaintiff's education and
business experience; (3) the amount of time plaintiff had for deliberation about the
release before signing it; (4) whether plaintiff knew or should have known his rights
upon execution of the release; (5) whether plaintiff was encouraged to seek, or in fact
received benefit of counsel; (6) whether there was an opportunity for negotiation of
the terms of the [a]greement; and (7) whether the consideration given in exchange for
the waiver and accepted by the employee exceeds the benefits to which the employee
was already entitled by contract or law.
Id. (quoting Cirillo v. Arch Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also Coventry
v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 524 & n. 12 (3d Cir. 1988) (analyzing a waiver of
an age discrimination claim where Judge Higginbotham, in writing for the majority, noted
that when an employee is faced with a "Hobson's choice" or "take it or leave it" situation in
signing a waiver of statutory rights, this dilemma supports a finding that the decision "was not
knowingly and willfully made" and that the company had placed "unfair economic pressure"
on the employee).
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disadvantages in outcomes and even overall costs identified in this Article.
As a contrast, repeat player large employers with huge litigation budgets, an
in-house corporate legal department, and highly-paid outside legal counsel
may have larger issues to address with the handling of one case as it pertains
to future claims. But given the differences in lacking the financial
wherewithal to navigate the complex and costly litigation system,
arbitration, even mandatory arbitration with its additional attendant costs
and disadvantages, may still be enticing to small employers.
261
V. NEW MILLENNIUM PROPOSAL: CREATING A PUNITIVE DAMAGE
DEFENSE AS AN INCENTIVE TO USE ARBITRATION AFTER A DISPUTE ARISES
Few commentators have challenged the purported benefits of agreeing
to use ADR after a dispute has occurred because it resembles the widely-
accepted practice of settlement. 262 At least, the legal and political costs that
remain prevalent with mandatory arbitration would be removed with the
decision to use binding arbitration after the dispute arises. Some skeptics
have argued that few employers will choose to use arbitration after the
dispute has arisen.263 Large employers are still concerned about the prospect
261. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, a more practical alternative for
handling the unique issues for small employers would be a congressional amendment
allowing the special handling of mandatory arbitration for smaller employers. Congress has
been especially concerned of late about the impact of litigation on small employers. See, e.g.,
Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 106 Stat. 185 (1999) (creating certain exceptions for small
employers involved in actions related to problems caused by the transition to the year 2000).
A small employer under the Y2K Act is defined as a defendant: (A) who "(i) is sued in his or
her capacity as an individual; and (ii) whose net worth does not exceed $500,000; or (B) that
is an unincorporated business, a partnership, corporation, association, or organization, with
fewer than 50 full-time employees." Id. at § 2. Under this definition, Congress could amend
Title VII (as currently amended by the Act), the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), or both to
allow the enforcement of mandatory arbitration exceptions for small employers.
262. See, e.g., Yarkon, supra note 252, at 168-72 (describing the benefits and
incentives to settlement in employment discrimination cases). Notable opponents of
settlement have included then-Professor, now Judge, Harry Edwards and Professor Owen
Fiss, respectively. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1986) (raising concerns about the tendency of ADR to
diminish pressure on courts to resolve important constitutional and public law issues); Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (analyzing adjudication in terms of
public values that are threatened by settlement and ADR processes).
263. See St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 67, at 8 & n.25 (stating that
there was strong testimony to the Dunlop Commission from management representatives that
employers generally would not be willing to arbitrate after a dispute arose and would instead
just wait the plaintiff out); see also Fitzgibbon, Reflections, supra note 67, at 248 (asserting
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of excessive punitive damage verdicts from runaway juries and mounting
legal fees. Still, there remains some incentive to still use arbitration after the
dispute arises.
To further encourage the use of arbitration after a dispute arises and in
order to allow an employer a defense to any punitive damage claims if the
employer gave an unconditional offer to arbitrate the dispute after it arose,
Congress should amend Title VII, and in particular section 118 of the
Act.264 The offer to arbitrate would create an affirmative defense that an
employer may use to block any punitive damages claims brought under the
Act. This would create an express incentive for employers to arbitrate after a
dispute arose.
To enforce the punitive damages defense, an employer's unconditional
offer to arbitrate must involve fair procedures that are not one-sided. As the
courts are already starting to do after the Cole decision and consistent with
the Protocol and similar rules established by ADR providers, any arbitration
agreement that fails to provide minimum guarantees of fairness will not be
enforced. The result is that these arbitrations may tend to be a little more
like litigation.265 But those basic procedures have become necessary to
guarantee that the arbitral forum approximates the judicial forum without
denying participants any substantive guarantees.
Courts may already be able to find that a post-dispute offer to arbitrate
limits punitive damages. The Supreme Court recently stated in Kolstad v.
American Dental Association,266 that an employer's "good faith" efforts
will provide a safe harbor from punitive damage claims brought under the
that arbitration must be mandatory because employers will not arbitrate every case after a
dispute arises); ACLU Supports Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ALTERNATIVE DisP.
RESOL. ALERT, Nov. 1995, at I (describing in a monthly newsletter update published by
management law firm, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, the comments from an
interview of Lewis Maltby, Director of the ACLU's National Taskforce on Civil Liberties in
the Workplace, where he stated, "[N]o employee with any sense would agree to arbitrate the
'brass ring' case, and likewise no employer would agree to arbitrate a case that is unlikely to
attract the interest of a plaintiff's lawyer or the EEOC."). By allowing an offer of arbitration
to cut off punitive damages as described in this section of this Article, it would possibly
tarnish the advantage for an employee to take the brass ring case to court and it would still
provide an incentive for an employer to arbitrate a case that may not attract a plaintiff's
lawyer or the EEOC by cutting off punitive damage claims.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (statutory note).
265. Sabatino, supra note 104, at 1348-49 (describing the benefits of a "litigation lite"
system, which allows ADR to add some components that make it closer to litigation).
266. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
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Act. 267 What efforts are considered to be "good faith" efforts by the
employer? Although specific acts are not identified, in writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor found that employers who implement written
anti-discrimination policies, provide educational awareness sessions to
employees, and take other steps to create and maintain a discrimination-free
workplace can avoid punitive damage liability for discriminatory acts of
supervisors and employees.268 Offering a fair arbitration process after a
dispute arises could constitute evidence of other acts in support of the
employer's good faith efforts to. eradicate discrimination quickly.269 From
this approach, even large employers have some incentive to use voluntary
arbitration after the dispute arises.
267. Id. at 2123 (finding in a 7-2 vote that an employer cannot be found liable for
punitive damages under the Act if it has a strong policy against discrimination and it acts in
good faith even if a supervisor's conduct was contrary to their policy); see also David G.
Savage, New Damages Insurance, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 48 (quoting management attorney
who has stated that the Kolstad decision is a "huge victory for employers" who "will [likely]
be able to show that a supervisor's conduct was contrary to their policies" and prevent the
possibility of a punitive damage claim). But see EEOC v. Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.
1999) (finding that, although an employer had adopted anti-discrimination policies, those
policies did not provide a safe harbor from punitive damage claims because the evidence
showed that the supervisors who discriminated against the employee were not familiar with
the accommodation requirements of the Americans With Disabilities Act or with Wal-Mart's
anti-discrimination policy and had never received training on this subject from Wal-Mart).
268. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2123.
269. Because Kolstad left open the question of exactly what employers must do to
demonstrate good faith efforts to comply with Title VIi, it would appear that adopting anti-
discrimination policies and increasing efforts by an employer to resolve the dispute through
ADR and without litigation would support the denial of any punitive damage award. See
Douglas E. Motzenbecker, Higher Bar For Tittle VII Punitive Damages, LITIGATION NEWS,
Sept. 1999, at 1-2. This article quotes management attorney Barbara Ryniker Evans'
statements that the Kolstad decision was a reasonable extension of the Supreme Court's 1998
decisions in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Farragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), which found that employers may avoid sexual harassment
liability by showing that they exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
discriminatory conduct and that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer because, after Kolstad, "employers have
never had better reason to adopt antidiscrimination policies and grievance procedures, and to
train their supervisors on Title Vll's requirements." Id.; cf. Jan William Sturner, Arbitration,
Labor Contracts, and the ADA: The Benefits of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements and an
Update on the Conflict Between the Duty to Accommodate and Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 455, 515-16 (1999) (reviewing comments made to Congress regarding the
benefits of having the EEOC support mandatory arbitration rather than challenge it and
testimony given suggesting that the EEOC should adopt a policy requiring that employees use
the employer's grievance procedure before the EEOC will process a charge).
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With an affirmative defense to punitive damages, small employers can
use arbitration after a dispute arises without incurring the legal difficulties
and increased uncertainties that mandatory arbitration presents. Moreover,
they can resolve the dispute quickly, avoiding the complex financial burdens
that the litigation system offers. Also, large employers would have a well-
defined incentive to pursue post-dispute arbitration-the elimination of the
dreaded punitive damages. Because employees do have legitimate
advantages in arbitration that they do not have in the courts, employees
would benefit from using arbitration even at the expense of not having a
claim for punitive damages available, especially given the lack of success
with such claims in the judicial system. If arbitration and other methods of
dispute resolution are truly encouraged by Congress, then adopting this
proposal would show that Congress and the courts have endorsed ADR
without unfairly coercing an employee to give up the right to the judicial
forum as a condition of employment.
VI. EPILOGUE: MOVING THE DEBATE BEYOND MANDATORY ARBITRATION
The increasing use of mandatory arbitration by some employers has
constituted an ill-advised departure from the overwhelmingly successful
experience of employers in the court system. Without much evidence of an
advantage, some employers quickly pursued the mandatory arbitration
option when it became available in 1991. By giving up on the significant
advantage that summary judgment and other court procedures provide, those
employers have relinquished their stranglehold on the way employment
discrimination disputes are resolved.
Whatever advantage mandatory arbitration may have provided
employers has been lost over the last several years. Because the Supreme
Court is reluctant to give any further explanation of mandatory arbitration
since Gilmer, employers have no clear legal protection from using
mandatory arbitration agreements and a tremendous amount of uncertainty
about their enforcement. Furthermore, legal costs have increased because a
number of employee and civil rights groups continue, with limited success,
to bring actions challenging mandatory arbitration in the court system.
Political backlash even forced the securities industry to virtually eliminate
mandatory arbitration. Also, as lower courts have become more concerned
about the fairness of the arbitration agreement, they have required certain
procedures that make arbitration resemble the court system. Culminating
with the virtual ineffectiveness of mandatory arbitration when the EEOC
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becomes involved, the rhetoric regarding employer advantage in pursuing
mandatory arbitration is nothing more than a myth.
Without investigating the bottom-line costs, the enthusiasm for
mandatory arbitration in the 1990s may have been fostered by an
unnecessary fear of jury verdicts and rising legal fees. As we approach a
new millennium, employers and their counsel need to make critical
empirical findings to support their dispute resolution choices and to
understand the effects of those choices.
The courts or Congress can help end the debate about mandatory
arbitration by providing employers with an incentive to use arbitration after
a dispute arises. A defense to punitive damages would create this incentive.
With this incentive, both small and large employers may finally be able to
identify a clear advantage to using arbitration, allowing employers to truly
decide whether arbitration provides a second-class option to the
overwhelming success of the court system.270 Given the increasing use of
mediation by employers, the critical ADR focus may now also shift to
understanding mediation's effect on resolving employment discrimination
disputes. 27 1 Then, the myth of employer advantage from mandatory
arbitration can finally be put to rest.
270. Few critics have recently addressed whether the arbitration of discrimination
claims provides a problem for our system ofjustice as a whole. See Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1055, 1058-60 (1996) (bemoaning
the lack of recent scholarly discourse and critique of ADR with respect to a general imbalance
in power for those who may not benefit from an informal dispute resolution option, especially
those lacking power because of racial, gender, or economic status); see also Green, supra note
30, at 175 & n. 15 (noting a general failure of scholarly literature to address the use of
mandatory arbitration from the perspective of the individuals who the civil rights laws were
intended to protect). See generally Stone, supra note 4 (criticizing the use of arbitration as a
delegation of court responsibility to self-regulating communities and suggesting a different
level of judicial review and analytical enforcement of arbitration matters involving
community outsiders versus insiders).
271. Some examples of this kind of critique are starting to develop. See Nancy H.
Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to
Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 831 (1998)
(encouraging the general use of mediation for dispute resolution); Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle
Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational
Conflict Management Perspective in Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1998)
(encouraging same in employment disputes); see also Harkavy, supra note 90, at 150-64,
168-69 (encouraging same in employment disputes involving harassment); Yelnosky, supra
note 170, at 156 (encouraging same). But see Nolan-Haley, supra note 9, at 778-80
(criticizing the increasing use of mediation when the choice to use mediation and the resulting
settlement agreement were not based on informed consent).

